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Abstract
Microfinance has become one of the most promising tools for development and poverty 
alleviation over the past two decades. Millions of borrowers around the globe have utilized 
microcredit to start or expand their small businesses and raise their household income. One 
poverty-induced problem microfinance could potentially alleviate is child labor. Despite 
international legislation prohibiting it, child labor continues to deprive millions of children 
of their right to education. Without education, there is little hope for a country to increase 
productivity and wealth in the future. A number of scholars have highlighted a negative 
correlation between credit rationing and child labor. However, there are no studies that 
examine whether or not children are less likely to work in households that participate in 
microfinance programs. In some circumstances, microcredit may increase household 
income and induce parents to withdraw their children from work while in others, raising 
the household income level may lead children to work more. In low-income countries with 
numerous microfinance institutions, many children work despite their parents’ access to 
credit. In order to examine this paradoxical phenomenon, this thesis presents a number of 
econometric models which analyze both child labor and credit at the household level. 
Though these models are vital in explaining the relevant trends, a purely economic analysis 
fails to capture the political and cultural factors that also engender child labor. To illustrate 
this complex relationship between economics and mores, this thesis highlights the impact 
of microfinance on child labor in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is an ideal country for this study 
because microfinance and child labor are both endemic. Finally, conclusions drawn from 
this analysis inform policy recommendations to amplify the effectiveness of microfinance 
on diminishing child labor
1Introduction
Halima is 12 years old and works at a processing plant in Khulna, Bangladesh de-
heading, shelling and packing shrimp for 10 hours a day. She receives 43 takas for her 
labor (US $0.62) and has been working since she was 5 years old because, in her own 
words, she has “no other choice.” Her mother is a messenger at a nearby school and her 
father is a day laborer who is currently unemployed. Halima dreams of pursuing an 
education so that she can become a social worker and help other poor children because 
she feels that she can represent them. After work, Halima goes to an informal school for 
two hours where she learns to read and write. Halima has never attended formal school 
because her family has never been able to survive without her income. There are millions 
of children just like Halima around the world who are denied their basic human rights to 
an education and well-being by having to work. If Halima’s parents had access to credit, 
they may be able to send her to school, however, this is not necessarily the case. 
In order to assess the hypothesis that microfinance can have ambiguous effects on 
child labor in Bangladesh, the first two chapters address both topics at the theoretical and 
global levels. Chapter one begins by distinguishing between the “promotional” and 
“protectional” approaches to microfinance. “Promotional” microfinance initiatives seek 
to alleviate poverty in the long run through self-employment and therefore exclude the 
poorest, while the objective of “protectional” programs is to mitigate fluctuations in 
income and fulfill the basic needs of the poorest in the short term (Hulme and Mosley 
1997, 100). The following section explains that the poor lack access to credit and 
financial services provided by mainstream commercial banks because they lack 
2collateral, identification, savings for registration and initial fees and financial education. 
The exclusion of the poor from the formal economy not only renders them 
socioeconomically invisible, but also prevents them from consuming beyond their 
immediate means and investing in their business or the education of their children in 
order to escape poverty.  
Microfinance enables families to expend more than they earn, but in order to 
maximize its effectiveness, microfinance institutions (MFIs) must focus on a particular 
group of the poor and design a program that provides financial and social services that 
suit their needs. Because the poor demand different services depending on their gender, 
income level and geographical location, there are several types of financial service 
providers. Informal providers include friends or relatives, moneylenders, deposit 
collectors, pawnbrokers and credit and savings associations known as ROSCAs and 
ASCAs. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) comprise their own category and 
usually buttress microfinance with other health, education and social programs. In 
contrast, there are formal financial institutions involved in microfinance including 
specialized microfinance and mainstream commercial banks whose economies of scale 
lower their transaction costs which enables them to offer more services to the poor at a 
lower price. Unfortunately, large-scale commercial banks still lack the incentive to lend 
to poor clients who lack collateral and pose a high risk of default. Contrary to popular 
belief, however, microfinance can be profitable, for the world’s top MFIs had average 
rates of return that rival those of mainstream commercial banks. 
The central governments of low-income countries often adopt microfinance as 
one facet of their developmental strategy and can facilitate its success by achieving some 
3degree of macroeconomic stability, improving financial infrastructure and establishing a 
regulatory framework for the provision of financial services to the poor. Microfinance is 
ubiquitous throughout the Third World because numerous studies demonstrate that 
microfinance can reduce the vulnerability of the poor in times of crisis by raising 
household income. Despite all of the praise it garners, scholars generally agree that 
microfinance is not the appropriate tool to combat all degrees of poverty because the 
most destitute citizens must meet their basic needs first. Others argue that the current 
emphasis on microfinance in the development field diverts attention and Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) from more vital programs and even that microcredit can 
entrench poor borrowers further into debt. 
Chapter two informs the reader about child labor on the macro and 
microeconomic levels. Children who work are classified as either being “economically 
active”, engaged in “child labor” or engaged in “hazardous work”. In the international 
political realm, “child labor” is the most widely employed category and accounts for 
approximately 166 million children worldwide. Scholars and organizations such as the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) have criticized statistics collected by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) for their failure to adequately capture the extent 
to which children, especially girls, contribute to household income. Globally, agriculture 
is the primary activity of working children and boys are much more likely to work than 
girls. Interestingly enough, most child laborers work in their own household rather than 
participating in the wage labor market. Though the dominance of domestic labor 
diminishes the likelihood that children will be engaged in activities that threaten their 
safety and well-being, most forms of child labor impede the ability of children to receive 
4an adequate education. In spite of international accords created by the ILO and the United 
Nations (UN) to establish minimum age standards and protect the rights of children, child 
labor continues to plague much of the world. 
Poverty is the primary determinant of child labor, but cultural and social factors 
also play a role. Statistics indicate that there is a strong, negative correlation between 
GDP and the incidence of child labor worldwide, however, what is more pertinent to this 
thesis is that poverty and child labor are positively correlated at the household level 
(Schultz 1960; Basu and Van 1998). Economists posit that in extremely poor households, 
work and school are substitutes for children which keeps them caught in the so-called 
“child labor trap” (Basu and Van 1998; Wahba 2002; Emerson and Souza 2003; Baland 
and Robinson 2000). Conversely, there are a number of economic studies that do not find 
a significant correlation between household income and child labor, but that instead 
attribute child labor to a host of factors including culture, infrastructural development and 
the availability of viable alternatives (Ray 2000; Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005; Bhatty 
1998). 
One key observation is the counterintuitive observation that increases in 
household income can actually increase child labor, a phenomenon known as the “wealth 
paradox”, an idea that is very important in the context of Bangladesh (Rogers and 
Swinnerton 2003; Edmonds and Turk 2004; Kanbargi and Kulkarni 1991; Basu and 
Tzannatos 2003). In its final portion, this chapter seeks to emphasize the positive 
relationship demonstrated by scholars between credit constraints and child labor that 
enables policymakers to see the inherent potential of microfinance programs to diminish 
5child labor (Jacoby and Skoufias 1997; Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti 2002; Ranjan 1999, 
2001; Guarcello, et. al 2002). 
Chapter three is the crux of this thesis and focuses specifically on the relationship 
between microfinance and child labor in Bangladesh. As a result of its extremely dense 
population, low-productivity economy and acute vulnerability to natural disasters, 
approximately 80 percent of Bangladeshis live on less than US $2 per day. Consequently, 
the majority of the population operates in the informal market where they are excluded 
from formal financial services. The central government of Bangladesh is also highly 
decentralized, elitist, corrupt and ineffective in enforcing legislation. This environment 
incited economics Professor Muhammad Yunus to launch an unprecedented experiment 
to lend his own money to poor, rural women to start their own small businesses. After 
thirty years of successfully lending to poor women, Grameen Bank is the most 
recognized and imitated microfinance institution in the world. Today the microfinance 
industry serves about 25 million clients most of whom participate in BRAC, Grameen 
Bank, ASA and Proshika programs (Credit and Development Forum 2006). The majority 
of MFIs in Bangladesh target rural women who own less than half an acre of land and 
offer small-scale, collateral-free loans and savings accounts so that they can start or 
expand their small business or cope with economic shocks and crises. 
Many of the same factors that have led to the pervasiveness of microfinance in 
Bangladesh also incite children to work. Almost 13 percent of Bangladeshi children are 
engaged in child labor and the majority of child laborers do not attend school at all 
(MICS 2006, 101). Though most children work domestically and are less apt to be 
engaged in hazardous work they are still impeded from attending school. Child labor not 
6only infringes on the rights of individual children to receive an education and enjoy time 
for leisure today, but also prevents the development of a skilled workforce that will lead 
to economic growth in the future. Data from Bangladesh supports global trends 
delineating poverty as the most salient factor in determining the likelihood that children 
will work (Delap 2001; Salmon 2005; Amin, Quays, Rives 2004; Save the Children UK; 
ILO 2006). Scholars have demonstrated that microfinance can raise household income 
levels in Bangladesh (Pitt and Khandker 1998) thus, in theory microfinance diminishes 
child labor, however, in reality it may produce ambiguous results. In one scenario, 
borrowers enjoy greater household incomes but economic gains may not be sufficient 
enough to enable parents to afford to withdraw their children from work. Economic status 
is also not the only factor that contributes to the high prevalence of child labor in 
Bangladesh as limited educational opportunities, gender discrimination, cultural 
perceptions of childhood and the demographic structure of the Bangladeshi labor market 
also play an important role. Natural disasters and seasonality in agriculture and 
employment render poor Bangladeshi households extremely vulnerable to negative 
economic shocks. Crises generally incite children to work, but access to credit has been 
shown to stabilize household income in Bangladesh (Morduch 1998; Pitt and Khandker 
1998; Khandker 1998) therefore it is possible that microfinance can decrease child labor 
by smoothing household income. Finally, it is theoretically possible that microfinance 
can actually increase child labor in a phenomenon known as the “Wealth Paradox”. If 
women pursue self-employment as a result of microcredit they may utilize their children 
as free, convenient labor to work in the family business. In this instance, girls are much 
more likely to suffer because they absorb household chores which Bangladeshi society 
7upholds to be exclusively female tasks. It is important to note that the majority of 
children whose parents participate in microfinance programs enjoy better food, clothing 
and housing. Field observations suggest that there are children who are negatively 
affected by their household’s participation in microfinance programs, although the 
incidence and extent of this phenomenon is unknown and warrants a more rigorous, 
quantitative assessment.    
The final chapter provides policy recommendations for improving the 
effectiveness of microfinance in Bangladesh in diminishing child labor. One suggestion is 
for MFIs to collaborate with children’s advocacy groups and target the parents of 
working children as borrowers. Another idea is to provide working children with the 
opportunity to save their earnings or, in some circumstances, even borrow small amounts 
to start their own businesses. Policymakers and scholars may never have intended for 
microfinance to be a vehicle for decreasing the incidence of child labor, but it certainly 
has the potential to do so.
8Chapter 1: Microfinance – Approaches, Structures and Global Trends 
Contrary to popular belief, microfinance is not new a new phenomenon. Since the 
beginning of commercial activity, the concept of microfinance has manifest itself in a 
variety of forms from credit cooperatives to local moneylenders to large-scale “Banks for 
the Poor” scattered throughout the world today. Since the inception of its modern form in 
the late 1970s in Latin America and Asia, microfinance has enabled millions of the 
world’s poor to access credit and financial services. Since the official year of the 
Microcredit and the Microcredit Summit Campaign in 1997, microcredit has grown an 
astonishing 978 percent (Daley-Harris 2006, 19). Criticized by many international actors 
for its over usage and generality, the term microfinance refers to a wide range of financial 
services including collateral-free, small-scale home, enterprise, and education loans;
savings, insurance, and pension schemes. Without access to credit and financial services, 
poor households cannot consume beyond their meager income levels, save in order to
cushion themselves against exogenous, negative income shocks or, in extreme cases, 
even afford to send their children to school. Eighty percent of the world’s poor lack 
access to credit and less than 2 percent has access to financial services (credit, deposit, or 
savings) from sources other than unregulated moneylenders that charge rates far 
exceeding those established by the market. Hence microfinance fills an important niche 
by enabling poor households to access the credit, capital and savings required to improve 
their economic and physical welfare.
Main Approaches 
9Although the range of financial services a microfinance institution (MFI) offers 
depends on the specific needs of its target clientele, two ideological and structural 
approaches dominate the industry. In the “promotional” strategy, organizations supply the 
poor with credit in order to generate self-employment and increase household income in 
the long run (Wood and Sharif 1997, 100). Within this framework, MFIs have different 
goals depending on the relative wealth of their borrowers. In lending to 
microentrepreneurs with larger and more profitable businesses, MFIs aim to achieve 
long-run growth throughout society and offer larger loans which enable borrowers to 
expand their businesses and create jobs for even poorer people. Most MFIs do not follow 
this “trickle-down” approach because it excludes the majority of the poor. As a result,
many MFIs have adopted with a “protectional” approach target poorer clients with the 
objective of alleviating more immediate symptoms of poverty and enabling households to 
cope with income volatility through small-scale credit and savings programs (Wood and 
Sharif 1997, 100). In this model, microfinance acts “as a first step to helping people 
escape poverty in the long term,” and over time clients can graduate to larger loan 
amounts (Dunford 1998, 6). Regardless of the institutional aims of various organizations 
and their particular clientele, microfinance provides the poor with access to financial 
services from which they are otherwise excluded. 
Why the Poor Lack Access to Credit
The crux of microfinance is to enable the poor to borrow and accumulate enough 
capital and savings to escape the inexorable cycle of poverty. Ideally, borrowers will 
eventually cease to rely on microfinance, become self-sufficient and graduate into 
participating in the formal economy. The majority of the world’s poor is limited to 
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operating in the informal economy and cannot access financial services from commercial 
banks because they lack collateral, identification, savings for registration and initial fees 
and financial education. These factors combined with geographical isolation of the rural 
population cause commercial banks to view the provision of financial services to the poor 
as a risky and unprofitable business. According to the World Bank, the inability of the 
poor to access credit and other banking services arises from “institutional failures that 
make contract enforcement difficult and do not address the problems of informational 
asymmetries and the poor’s lack of collateralizable wealth” (Perry 2006, 15). Simply 
stated, the traditional structure of commercial banking institutions is innately 
incompatible with the needs of the poor who lack documentation of their property, 
collateral and knowledge about finances. Because “effective participation in financial 
markets is a precondition for effective participation in the economy,” the exclusion of the 
world’s poorest citizens from accessing formal financial services and markets translates 
into socioeconomic exclusion and invisibility (Kumar 2005, 15). Without the capacity to 
borrow and consume beyond their low incomes, poor households cannot invest in items 
with long-run returns such as household improvements, small businesses or even the 
education of their children thereby perpetuating the intergenerational transmission of 
poverty.
Financial Service Providers
It is clear that integrating the poor into the formal economy in the long run 
requires that they have access to financial services. Poor clients demand different services 
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than those offered by conventional banks and their needs vary depending on their income 
level, geographic location and community. As a result, there are several types of financial 
service providers ranging from informal moneylenders and credit cooperatives at the 
village level to large-scale commercial banks. Today approximately one-third of poor 
clients gain access financial services through microfinance NGOs, one-third through 
mainstream financial institutions and one-third through cooperatives and credit unions 
(Women’s World Banking 2003). Each approach has its respective strengths and 
weaknesses which must be analyzed within the context of the needs of its target clientele. 
Individual informal service providers include a friend or relative, local moneylenders, 
deposit collectors (i.e. people who collect and store savings) pawnbrokers, and, in 
agricultural areas, traders, processors and input suppliers (Helms 2006, 37-38). 
Borrowing from a friend or relative can be awkward, embarrassing and potentially 
detrimental to a personal relationship. Local moneylenders and pawnbrokers are 
notorious for exploiting poor borrowers by charging them exorbitant interest rates while 
in many places deposit collectors may not be reliable. Rotating credit and savings 
associations (ROSCAs) and accumulating savings and credit associations (ASCAs) are 
the most effective informal financial service providers behind NGOs because borrowers 
are responsible for their ownership and management. In both formations, group members 
donate to a self-managed, collective fund. In ROSCAs, contributors receive either a 
portion of or the entire “pot” in rotation or by lottery and the fund is liquated with every 
cycle (Helms 2006, 39). In ASCAs, however, some contributors borrow and some do not, 
therefore the fund increases with time (Helms 2006, 39). ROSCAs and ASCAs are 
extremely popular throughout the world today because “they are efficient and cost little 
12
to run, they are transparent and easy for members to understand, no outsiders are 
involved, no cash is stored since it passes from member to member, and the risks of 
misappropriation are low” (Helms 2006, 39). Though ASCAs generally offer more 
services, they require a higher level of managerial skills and run the risk of fraud because 
the money does not rotate evenly throughout the group (Helms 2006, 39). 
Financial service associations, self-help groups and cooperatives comprise 
another category of informal service providers that are owned and controlled by their 
members. These groups are formed at the local level and usually provide a broader range 
of financial services including savings, checking accounts, loans, insurance and transfer 
services. One of the advantages of these schemes is that group members are shareholders 
and, as a result, receive dividends, higher interest rates on savings accounts, lower loan 
rates, and innovative and superior services than those who borrower from exogenous 
institutions (Helms 2006, 42-43). One of the primary disadvantages of endogenous 
financial associations is that they are voluntarily managed and their members often lack 
the requisite skills to run such an organization. Another drawback is that financial 
regulators rarely oversee or monitor their operations which diminishes external pressure 
to increase efficiency and transparency, and leaves members’ funds vulnerable to internal 
conflict and corruption (Helms 2006, 44). Though all of these informal service providers 
enable the poor to borrow and save, they can be expensive, rigid, risky, opaque, corrupt, 
deceitful and vulnerable to collective external shocks such as illness, natural disasters and 
crop failure (Helms 2006, 40). 
Unlike these informal providers and groups, NGOs are usually formed at the 
regional or national level and establish branches in vulnerable neighborhoods and 
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villages. NGOs inhabit their own category and usually have a more holistic and altruistic 
approach to providing financial services. Some NGOs serve as the intermediary between 
small-business owners and formal banks, thereby enabling them to access credit, while 
others couple financial services with social and development programs such as 
entrepreneurial, health, and family planning education (Helms 2006, 44). The CGAP 
estimates that there are 9,000 NGOs worldwide that provide the poor with access to 
financial services (Helms 2006, 45). Unfortunately, NGOs are often limited in their 
capacity to offer a wide range of flexible financial services due to donor constraints. Most 
NGOs aim to become formal, sustainable financial institutions in order to serve more 
poor clients and expand the range of non-credit interventions they offer such as skills and 
vocational training, informal primary education, etc. In certain circumstances, the push 
for commercialization can hinder the institutional effectiveness of NGOs and even hurt 
the well-being of borrowers. The most successful transition from NGO to commercial 
institution is the Grameen Bank, which, with the passage of a special law created only for 
it, legally became a poverty-oriented development bank in 1983.
Formal financial institutions that provide services to the poor range from 
commercial banks that create social programs based on government incentives to 
specialized microfinance banks such as the Grameen Bank. As previously mentioned, the 
majority of microfinance clients still access financial services through government-
owned development, agricultural, savings and postal banks – it is often the only option 
available to the rural poor outside of their village moneylender (Helms 2006, 49). Small 
community or rural banks, specialized microfinance banks, and full-service banks that 
offer microfinance also fall into this category. According to CGAP, there are only 225 
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commercial financial institutions involved in microfinance in some way, however, 
participating commercial banks are more cost-efficient in delivering financial services to 
the poor (Helms 2006, 49).
Though few currently offer financial services exclusively tailored to the poor, 
large private banks do in fact have their niche in microfinance. Both private and state-
owned commercial banks have the advantage of economies of scale in lowering their 
transaction costs, but considering their objective is economic profit and not poverty 
reduction, the high per-unit expenses are eclipsed by the low returns received on 
microloans. For example, commercial banks can charge lending rates as low as 14 
percent while MFIs are forced to charge 31 percent (Unitus 2006). According to the 
Women’s World Banking Network, “Most mainstream financial institutions still do not 
see the poor as a major untapped market of bankable customers,” because they are 
generally a high-risk, geographically isolated, and uneducated segment of the population 
who cannot generate the same level of profits for the bank as their wealthier counterparts 
(WWB 2003). If banks are going to enter into the microfinance market, they should 
utilize their capital and management structures to establish subsidiary institutions, build 
new microfinance and/or rural branches, and research and develop innovative services for 
the poor. Commercial banks have a competitive advantage other financial service 
providers because they are part of a well-developed financial network which enables 
them to access financing from donors and other institutions more easily. The hope is that 
as MFIs accrue more capital and become commercial institutions, conventional banks 
will see their success and will be enticed to enter the microfinance market. The entry of 
large-scale commercial banks into the microfinance market will increase competition and 
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lead to the provision of a greater variety of services for poor clients at a lower cost. This 
process may be years away, however, for commercial banks still lack the economic 
incentive to offer credit and savings to the poor because of the inherent risk in lending to 
them.
Contrary to popular belief, providing financial services to the poor is not merely a 
charitable endeavour. In fact, after adjusting for inflation and subsidies programs 
received, 63 of the world’s top MFIs had an average rate of return of about 2.5 percent of 
total assets which is comparable to returns from commercial banking (Microfinance 
Gateway 2006). The key to achieving long-term sustainability success are high 
repayment and cost-recovery rates that allow “Banks for the Poor” to cover their 
transactions costs and provide financial services to a large client base at a lower cost. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that MFIs absolutely cannot serve the poorest while being 
profitable. On the contrary, research shows that sustainable MFIs that provide services to 
the very poor reach one and a half times more clients on average which implies that they 
are far more efficient while using fewer resources (Daley-Harris 2006, 21). In 
Bangladesh, ASA, meaning “hope” in Bengali, reaches more than 2.7 million clients, 
many of whom are very poor, and lends at a rate of US $0.35 cents per dollar earning it 
the illustrious title of “the most efficient MFI in the world” (Daley-Harris 2006, 21). As it 
stands today, however, the majority of MFIs do not share ASA’s economic efficiency and 
low transaction costs. 
Figure 1.1: Pros and Cons of Different Financial Service Providers
16
Source: Helms 2006, 56.
Transaction Costs and Interest Rates
MFIs have much higher transaction costs than their commercial counterparts as a 
result of the unique nature of lending to the poor. Microfinance clients lack collateral and 
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operate in the informal economy which means that they lack credit histories, financial 
records and legal proof of ownership of their assets. As a result, poor borrowers can only 
receive an unsecured loan, or one without collateral, which poses a greater risk to lenders. 
One way that MFIs have mitigated the risk of lending to the poor is to adapt a group-
lending model which utilizes peer pressure, reputation and honor, or “social collateral”, 
to hold individuals responsible for repayment. Still, MFIs must assess the 
creditworthiness of borrowers on the ground which requires a lot of manpower. In fact, 
lending risks are so high that transaction costs may constitute 25 percent of the value of 
the loan (Microfinance Gateway 2006). As experts at the Microfinance Gateway, a 
website that provides comprehensive information on the microfinance industry, explain:
A $100 dollar loan, for example, requires the same personnel and resources as a 
$2,000 one…[because] loan officers must visit the client's home or place of work, 
evaluate [their] creditworthiness on the basis of interviews with the client's family 
and references, and in many cases, follow through with visits to reinforce the 
repayment culture (Microfinance Gateway 2006).
These high credit assessment costs, along with the small loan size and long repayment 
period that characterize microloans, force MFIs to charge above-market interest rates to 
their clients. Though this seems counterintuitive in terms of decreasing household 
poverty, research shows that subsidized interest rates create excess demand that leads to 
even higher transaction costs that undermine the impact of the subsidy (Microfinance 
Gateway 2006). Moreover, clients have demonstrated their willingness to pay higher 
interest rates in order to ensure their continuing access to credit in the future. Ultimately, 
MFIs aim to become regulated financial institutions in order to attract more private 
capital, increase their operational efficiency and lower their transaction costs such that 
they can charge lower interest rates and provide financial services to more of the world’s 
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poor. The government and financial regulators play a key role in facilitating the formal 
institutionalization of microfinance.
The Role of Government and Financial Regulators
Without the government’s ideological and legislative support, low-income 
countries cannot successfully implement and maintain microfinance programs as part of 
their strategy to reduce poverty and increase economic growth. Macroeconomic policies 
and financial regulations can greatly hinder or enable the success of the microfinance 
industry in a given country. Though it is tempting and relatively easier to for 
governments to provide credit directly to their citizens, the Women’s World Banking 
Network asserts that, “government programs – normally based on a social welfare, 
subsidy approach - nearly always end in being used as vehicles for political patronage, 
extremely low repayments, market distortions, and eventual truncation of services” 
(WWB 2002, 8). Over the past twenty years, the majority of government microfinance 
initiatives have generally failed because they lack adequate client targeting and 
inconsistently punish defaulters (CGAP 2007). In instances where the government has 
successfully participated in microfinance schemes, the state has funded independent 
MFIs such as the Grameen Bank. Ideally, public banks should not be microfinance 
“retailers,” though if they autonomously select clients, provide unsubsidized lending rates 
and separate microfinance operations from their other financial services it is possible for 
governments to effectively disburse microfinance to the poor (WWB 2002).
Even if the government does not act directly provide credit to its poor population, 
it does play an essential role in facilitating and regulating the microfinance industry by 
enacting both pro-poor and pro-growth policies. In addition to establishing a regulatory 
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organ and promoting microfinance as part of its pro-poor strategy, low-income countries 
should also aim to stabilize their economy and avoid high inflation. Macroeconomic 
development is required to provide the government with adequate funding to monitor and 
regulate the microfinance industry and ensure its sustainability and effectiveness in the 
future. As the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) explains, “It is only 
through the development of the financial sector as a whole that sustainability of financial 
services for the lower segments in the market can be ensured and sustainable access to 
financial services by poor and low-income people guaranteed” (UNCDF 2003). Some of 
the most critical duties of a government seeking to expand microfinance include 
eliminating legislative barriers impeding MFIs from becoming regulated financial 
institutions and allowing competition to determine interest rates as opposed to 
subsidizing them. When governments eliminate interest rate ceilings they may increase 
market efficiency and lower interest rates over time, but doing so may mean that 
microfinance institutions can no longer cover their transaction costs which exceed those 
imposed by mainstream commercial banks (CGAP 2007).  
Governments should also implement legal standards for performance indicators 
which encourage transparency by establishing credit bureaus and rating and audit 
agencies to monitor the progress of the microfinance industry, maintain its integrity and 
facilitate the integration of MFIs “into the formal financial system” (van Gruening 1998, 
2). Though it is essential that licensing and reporting requirements remain strict, financial 
regulators should simplify their procedures and documentation to provide incentive for 
MFIs to comply. Moreover, the government must refrain from excessively intervening in 
internal structure of MFIs that need the “freedom to operate” and the ability to 
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autonomously decide on their branch structure, management and ownership (i.e. private 
local and foreign investors, NGOs, etc.) (van Gruening 1998, 2). Finally, federal laws 
that prohibit the disclosure of citizens’ financial history (in the absence of a credit report, 
this consists of utility bills, paychecks, etc.) should be eased so that MFIs can better 
assess the inherent risk of lending to a particular client. 
In order to facilitate the transition of MFIs to becoming regulated financial 
institutions, federal financial regulators should reduce minimum capital requirements and 
government officials should enact reforms to make taxes less regressive and biased in 
favor of large, private banks by providing “temporary tax incentives for microfinance 
institutions undertaking the costs of converting to formal, regulated structures” (van 
Gruening 1998, 2). Financial regulators should also encourage commercial banks to 
provide microcredit by easing restrictions on the percentage of a loan portfolio that can 
be lent on an unsecured basis (van Gruening 1998, 2). Limits on the establishment of new 
branches and their locations or form must also be removed and, in many countries, an 
alternative definition of “branch” must be adopted so that MFIs can offer a variety of 
financial services in both rural and urban areas (CGAP 2007). Unfortunately, if a 
government lacks the substantive power to enforce these legislative changes it will not be 
able to create a thriving and regulated microfinance industry. Even in the absence of 
government support, however, MFIs can effectively provide financial services to the poor 
and mitigate the symptoms of poverty. 
Statistics
MFIs operate in a wide array of political and cultural contexts and have become 
ubiquitous throughout the Third World. The Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest
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(CGAP), an organization of the world’s largest aid donors, functions as both an 
ideological and policy-orientated arm of global agencies dedicated to promoting, 
improving and expanding microfinance worldwide. According to their latest statistics, 
MFIs have amassed over US $750 million in collective savings from approximately 500 
million active clients (Helms 2006, 6). According to the Microcredit Summit Campaign 
Report, in 2006 over 3,000 microcredit institutions reached approximately 113,251,390 
clients, approximately 82 million of whom fell in the bottom half of those living below 
their country’s poverty line or below US $1 a day (Daley-Harris 2006, 18). Microfinance 
remains extremely concentrated in Asia, which accounts for 84 percent of all participants
(Helms 2006, 20), as a result of the fact that 67 percent of people in the world who 
subsist on less than US $1 a day live in the region (Daley-Harris 2006, 18).
Although these statistics seem impressive, participation rates represent a mere 
fraction of the over 3 billion people in the world who live below the official global 
poverty line of US $2 per day. Of the billions of impoverished people who lack access to 
credit, 500-600 million are eligible for microcredit that may enable them to improve the 
welfare of their families (PlaNet Finance 2006). The challenge for aid organizations, 
governments, and microfinance institutions is to augment the geographic and economic 
penetration, effectiveness and sustainability of microfinance with the hopes of eventually
incorporating the poor, extralegal sector into the formal economy and creating lasting 
change. 
Global Impact Assessment
Microfinance is only one facet of a country’s complex poverty-reduction and 
growth strategy that requires myriad legal, political and economic reforms, however, that 
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does not diminish its impact on the household level. Studies demonstrate the significant, 
positive impact of microfinance in raising household income levels and (Robinson 2001; 
Remenyi and Quinones 2000; Wright 2000; UNICEF 1997; Khandker 1998, 2001) 
reducing vulnerability to adverse income shocks (Wright 2000; Zaman 2000; McCulloch 
and Baulch 2000). In a study of over 24 countries, the NGO Unitus found that borrowers’ 
profits increased 25 to 40 percent as a result of their ability to purchase more raw 
materials and supplies (UNCDF 2003). These increases in income enable clients to spend 
more on health care, medicine, and education. Studies in Kenya, Honduras, (Ardon and 
Colindres 1997) Bolivia, (McNelly and Dunford 1999) Pakistan and Ghana (Bhalotra and 
Heady 2003) demonstrate that improved access to credit increases the school attendance 
rates and nutritional status of borrowers’ children. Savings has a smaller economic 
impact than credit, for it has not been shown to generate income, but it may be important 
in mitigating adverse income shocks and thereby enabling children to attend school or 
household members to seek medical attention and take time off work (Morduch and 
Haley 2002).
Female empowerment is another of the most important positive impacts of 
microfinance on participants. Around the world millions of poor women have gained 
economic and social clout both inside and outside of the household. For the fact that 
female microfinance clients in Bangladesh, Bolivia, Nepal, the Philippines, and Russia 
have all been elected into public office manifests its true potential to empower poor 
women around the world (Helms 2006, 31). These are merely a few examples of the 
potential of MFIs to change the status quo of the billions of people who continue to live 
in extreme poverty. As a testament to its efficacy, the United Nations endorsed 
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microcredit as “an effective tool for increasing productive capacities of local 
communities, the inclusion of poor people in economic flows, promoting local markets 
growth, creating jobs and employment opportunities” (Chowdhury 2004, 1). Today 
microfinance is one of the most popular and effective approaches to alleviating poverty at 
the grassroots level, though it is not without weaknesses.
Criticisms 
Despite the significance of these findings, critics argue that microfinance is not 
the universal prescription for development that many proclaim it to be. As previously 
mentioned, subsidy-dependent government programs distort market prices and negatively 
impact borrowers in the long run as interest payments exceed any accrued benefit from a 
subsidy. According to 2001 World Bank statistics, the top five MFIs reach almost half of 
the market and that only 1 percent of MFIs are financially stable which indicates the 
difficulties of achieving self-sufficiency in serving such a high-risk clientele (Unitus 
2006). Even though “many feel that once microfinance becomes mainstreamed, massive 
growth in the numbers of clients can be achieved…others worry that an excessive 
concern about profit in microfinance will lead MFIs up-market, to serve better off clients 
who can absorb larger loan amounts” (Microfinance Gateway 2006). This “crowding out” 
of private investment undermines MFIs’ purpose of societal development and equity by 
excluding the very population it sought to assist. 
Microfinance does not always suit the needs of the poor. The Consultative Group 
to Assist the Poorest (CGAP), an auxiliary of the World Bank, explains that extremely 
poor people whose lack of income prevents them from fulfilling their basic needs are not 
candidates for microfinance; in this instance, the CGAP suggests that “other tools will 
24
alleviate poverty better—for instance, small grants, employment and training programs, 
or infrastructure improvements…[which], where possible…should be coupled with 
building savings” (CGAP 2007). Development expert Marguerite Robinson espouses this 
view and argues that instead of credit or savings accounts for extremely poor households 
organizations should provide them with job creation, skills training, relocation, and 
adequate water, medicine, and nutrition. She continues, “Providing savings accounts and 
credit makes sense only for the ‘economically active’ poor [but] only (not the emphasis of 
the original author) savings is right for the poorest among this economically active 
population” (Daley-Harris 2006, 15). The most destitute of citizens often exclude 
themselves from microfinance schemes because they perceive themselves to be ineligible 
due to a lack of identification, liquid assets and savings, and financial education. 
Nevertheless, less than two-thirds of microfinance clients live below the extreme poverty 
line of US $1 per day though this trend is improving as MFIs seek to expand the range of 
clients and services offered (Helms 2006, 20).
On a country-wide scale, critics worry that official development assistance (ODA) 
will focus on establishing and expanding microfinance initiatives instead of providing the 
poor with assistance to meet their basic needs. As the Global Development Research 
Center articulates, many development experts fear “that official assistance will be 
diverted from vital primary care aid programs such as health, water projects and 
education into MFIs, owing to their popularity among donors” (GDRC 2005).
Governments facing volatile political, health and economic situations should first focus 
their resources on addressing pressing health concerns such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and
malnutrition prior to utilizing microfinance as part of their country’s developmental 
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strategy. In countries where microfinance has been adopted as a viable developmental 
tool, critics cite the pressure on MFIs to reach financial sustainability that diverts them 
from focusing on the effective provision of financial services to poor clients (Aminur 
Rahman 1998).
Research shows that in some cases microcredit may entrench poor borrowers 
further into debt (Montgomery 1996) and force them into an inescapable cycle of loans 
and repayment. The pressure to repay loans can take a toll on the borrower’s family for a 
number of studies in places such as Peru demonstrate that parents may withdraw their 
children from school and send them to work in order to make their loan installment 
(Gonzalez Aguilar 1999, 5). The ILO highlights a 1994 study conducted by USAID in 
Senegal that shows that microloans increase the workload of female borrowers to such an 
extent that they are often forced to employ their daughters or daughters-in-law as unpaid 
employees (ILO 1998). The impact of microfinance on children’s welfare must be 
analyzed contextually and, because therein lies the crux of this paper, the author will 
expand on this relationship in Bangladesh specifically.  
Critics also claim that microfinance is a temporary and shallow solution which 
fails to address the underlying inequities in the structure of the economy itself. The 
majority of the world’s poor operates in the extralegal, or informal, sector and are 
excluded from participating in the formal economy because of their financial, legal and 
educational status. The extralegal sector accounts for 50-75 percent of all working people 
and one-fifth to two-thirds of the total economic output of the Third World (De Soto 
2000, 85). Despite the fact that the informal economy contributes so much to a country’s 
total economic output, politicians and business elites do not want to change the status quo 
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and eliminate the “structural factors [which] maintain the economic marginalization of 
the poor” (Goetz and Sen Gupta 1995, 61). Economists Anne Marie Goetz and Rina Sen 
Gupta explain, “Credit and income-generating programs frame the problem of poverty as 
a temporary, and easily remedied, cash-flow problem, instead of one which bears on 
relations of inequality and their institutionalization in broader economic policy” (Goetz 
and Sen Gupta 1995, 61). In order to address this structural inequity, governments must 
first admit that it exists. According to economist Hernando DeSoto, “The real problem 
developing countries face…is the failure of governments to recognize the power, 
resources, and significance of the extralegal sector” (DeSoto 2000, 102-103). 
In many low-income countries with inefficient and corrupt bureaucracies, 
becoming a formal enterprise or demonstrating ownership of property is so costly, time-
consuming and cumbersome that only wealthy business or land owners with an 
understanding of the financial system can do so. In some instances, countries have not 
even formalized property rights which prevent the poor from utilizing their property or 
assets as collateral in order to borrow and protecting themselves from conflicting claims. 
DeSoto explains that “the result (of not having records or contracts) is that most people’s 
resources are commercially and financially invisible,” which means that even if poor 
borrowers gain access to credit and savings through microfinance programs they will still 
be unable to accumulate the capital requisite of participating in the formal financial sector 
(DeSoto 2000, 32). In the long run, microfinance initiatives can only do so much to 
improve the social and economic status of the poor, for without property rights and legal 
documentation a country cannot and will not truly integrate the poor into the formal 
economic and legal systems. Though there is no step-by-step plan to do this, however, 
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many low-income countries need a “crucial change,” which is “adapting the law to the 
social and economic needs of the majority of the population,” no matter how arduous or 
impossible it may seem to do so, in order to ensure economic growth and political 
stability in the long run (DeSoto 2000, 106).
Conclusion
Overall, microfinance has improved the livelihood of millions of poor borrowers 
who would otherwise be unable to access credit, savings, and other services that enable 
them to augment their incomes. In order to function more effectively and expand their 
outreach, MFIs should expand the range of microfinance services offered to better suit 
the needs of the poorest, combine financial services with social and educational programs 
and better assess their impact on the community and macroeconomic levels. In order to 
amplify its effect, microfinance should be complemented with “other interventions like 
social protection programs, wage employment schemes, education, [and] training…as 
part of a broader poverty eradication strategy” (Microfinance Gateway 2006). To 
maximize their potential and eventually reach sustainability, MFIs must tailor their 
services to serve the needs of a particular target client group based on geographical 
location, culture, gender, and borrowers’ objectives. Client targeting, monitoring, 
transparency, and the appropriate integration of microfinance into a country’s 
developmental strategy may mitigate the negative externalities mentioned earlier. The 
criticisms outlined in this chapter highlight the fact that there are negative externalities 
implicit in any poverty alleviation strategy. Though it may not be the universal 
prescription for poverty reduction, microfinance is “an inducer, a catalyst for economic 
activity of the poor people” that can increase their household income and improve their 
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lives (Chowdury 2004, 1). Unfortunately, millions of children from poor families have 
not reaped the benefits of microfinance and have to work so that their families can 
survive. The next chapter will explain the prevalence of and economic theories behind 
child labor in order to better understand how to combat it.
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Chapter 2: Child Labor – Global Statistics, Legislation and Economic Theories
Public indictments against the use of child labor by companies such as Nike and 
Gap have garnered media attention in the West over the past decade only to disappear out 
of the public arena when companies assert that they have ceased to rely upon children to 
make their products overseas. Despite its diminished international publicity, millions of 
children continue to work everyday. Child labor is not merely a relic of the past, but an 
enduring social and economic ill that modern governments must address in order to 
achieve sustainable economic growth in the long run. More importantly, child labor is a 
gross violation of some of the most basic human rights: education and freedom from 
exploitation. Children who work are denied the intellectual development and naïveté that 
distinguish adolescence from adulthood. Economic conditions and societal factors 
beyond a child’s control or comprehension force them to work. Children lack the 
knowledge, understanding and bargaining power of their elders and, consequently, it is 
up to adults to take action and speak out for the millions of children who suffer from the 
toils of labor. Before taking a stand, however, activists and policymakers must be aware 
of a number of basic premises within the context of child labor. 
Definitions and Statistics
First and foremost, who is a child? A married, thirteen-year-old girl? An eight-
year-old street child whose daily activities include taking care of his two-year-old sibling 
while selling candy and navigating the streets of a city’s slums, alone? A sixteen-year-old 
who is completely dependent upon her parents for her every corporal and emotional 
need? Societal and religious constructs of childhood vary widely around the world and 
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even within countries, but the most common definition of a child according to 
international labor standards is a person between the ages of 5 and 14. Even within these 
parameters, however, one difficulty in any discussion regarding child labor lies in the 
breadth and scope of definitions provided by scholars, governments, and international 
organizations. The International Labor Organization (ILO) identifies three categories of 
working children ordered according to their level of specificity: economic activity, child 
labor or hazardous work (ILO 2006, 6). Children who are economically active work at 
least one hour a week during the regular school week in any productive activity 
(excluding hazardous forms of labor) which is either paid or unpaid, “for a few hours or 
full time, on a casual or regular basis, legal or illegal” (Fares and Raju 2007, 2-3). 
Though this definition seems to be all encompassing, it excludes domestic work in the 
child’s household and school attendance. The category of economically active children 
has no legal significance because it is merely a statistical one. According to the ILO’s 
most recent data, 190.7 million, or 15.8 percent, of the world’s 1.2 billion children 
between the ages of 5-14, are economically active1 (ILO 2006, 6). Though this statistic 
seems daunting, the number of economically active children in the world has declined by 
9.6 percent since 2000, when 211 million children fell into this category (ILO 2006, 6).
Within this comprehensive definition of economically active children, child labor 
receives the most attention. Child labor includes: i) all children between the ages of 5-11 
who are economically active, ii) children between the ages of 12-14 who work in an 
  
1 ILO data on child labor is collected by its Statistical Information and Monitoring Program on Child Labor 
(SIMPOC). SIMPOC statistics are based on its own national surveys; World Bank’s Living Standards 
Measurement Study (LSMS) surveys; the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) conducted by the 
United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF); labor force surveys; the United Nations Population Division; and 
the inter-agency Understanding Children’s Work (UCW) Project (ILO 2006, 5).
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economic activity for 14 or more hours per week, and iii) children between 12-17 who 
work in “the worst forms of child labor” (Fares and Raju 2007, 3). According to the ILO, 
165.8 million, or 13.7 percent, of the world’s children aged 5-14 were engaged in child 
labor in 2004 (ILO 2006, 6). Again, this statistic seems grim, but the worldwide 
incidence of child labor has decreased 11 percent since 2000, from 186.3 million (ILO 
2006, 6). The most troubling group of economically active children are those engaged in 
hazardous work which is “any activity or occupation that, by its nature or its type, has or 
leads to adverse effects on the child’s safety, health (physical or mental) and moral 
development” (ILO 2006, 6). Hazards include excessive workload and working hours, 
psychological and physical abuse and dangerous physical conditions. In 2004, 74.4 
million, or 6.2 percent, of children between the ages of 5-14 were engaged in hazardous 
work (ILO 2006, 6). Fortunately, the most promising strides in the fight to reduce child 
labor are among the most vulnerable children; from 2000 to 2004, the incidence of 
children participating in hazardous work between the ages of 5-14 dropped 33.2 percent 
(ILO 2006, 6). The worst forms of child labor2 fall into this category and include: i) 
slavery of economic activity in slave-like conditions, ii) prostitution or pornography, iii) 
illicit activities such as drug production and trafficking, and iv) economic activities that 
are likely to harm the health, safety, or morals of the child (Fares and Raju 2007, 3). 
Though over a hundred million children are still impeded in their ability to receive an 
education and have time for leisure, the progress achieved by child advocacy groups 
provides hope for eradicating child labor, especially in its most hazardous forms.
  
2 Convention 182 enacted in 1999, established the “worst forms of child labor.” See ensuing paragraphs for 
further details.
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Despite the specificity and general acceptance of these categories, scholars and 
organizations such as UNICEF have criticized the ILO for failing to incorporate unpaid 
domestic labor in a child’s own home into their estimates of child labor. Because girls do 
the majority of household work, which often inhibits or prohibits them from attending 
school, excluding their household contributions from the realm of economic activity 
severely underestimates their participation relative to that of boys (Basu and Tzannatos 
2003, 156). In her study of child labor in India, economist Neera Burra concludes that a 
significant portion of child labor appears “invisible to the casual observer” (Burra 1997, 
204). In fact, empirical research by the Indian National Council of Economic Research 
demonstrates that if child labor estimates include own-household, unpaid work, girls in 
India actually do 33 percent more work than boys (Cigno and Rosati 2001). The gross 
underestimation of the number of girls who work creates a gender bias in child labor 
statistics. As scholars Kaushik Basu and Zafiris Tzannatos explicate, “If this correction of 
33 percent is made to the adjusted estimate of economically active children, the number 
goes up to somewhere between 425 and 477 million. This would mean that close to 40 
percent of the world’s children are economically active” (Basu and Tzannatos 2003, 156). 
This implies that legislative policies should be designed to specifically target girls by 
promoting and ensuring their equal right to an education. Additionally, scholars critique 
the ILO’s assessment of economic activity because of its reference period. Economically 
active children are those who responded affirmatively when asked whether or not they 
have worked for one or more hours in the past week. A one-week survey period fails to 
capture the “frequent entry and exit of children” (Fares and Raju 2007, 3) in the labor 
market and inflates the number of children engaged in economic activity. As a result of 
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these ambiguities in the definition of economically active children, multilateral 
organizations and academics analyze the incidence of and issues facing working children 
in terms of child labor.
Global Child Labor Patterns
In reviewing the global statistics on child labor, important patterns emerge that 
can aid policymakers in creating more effective and targeted legislation to decrease the 
number of children who work in the world today. In 2004, the ILO found that 18.8 
percent of children in Asia and the Pacific, 5.7 percent of children in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, 26.4 percent of children in sub-Saharan Africa and 5.2 percent of children 
in other regions were economically active (ILO 2006, 7). Africa has the highest rate of 
child economic activity, for one out of every five children work; contrary to global 
trends, girls are much more likely to work than boys on the continent (Fares and Raju 
2007, 8). In a global survey of child labor using ILO statistics from 59 countries, scholars 
Jean Fares and Dhushyanth Raju conclude that boys are much more likely to work than 
girls, especially in hazardous work, and that the ratio of working boys to girls is 3:2 
(Fares and Raju 2007, 9). 
Boys are also more likely to work in agriculture which makes it the dominant 
economic activity for child laborers. The ILO estimates that 69 percent of economically 
active children work in the agricultural sector; 22 percent work in the services sector; and 
9 percent work in industry (ILO 2006, 7).3 A reliance on primary commodities and 
  
3 The agricultural sector includes farming, hunting, forestry, and fishing activities. The services sector is 
comprised of wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, transport, storage, and communications, 
finance, insurance, real estate and business services, and community, social and personal services. The 
industrial sector encompasses mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction and public utilities (ILO 
2006, 7).
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agricultural exports often characterizes low-income, low-growth countries; therefore it 
logically follows that these countries would have a higher incidence of child labor. In 
fact, even after controlling for income and literacy levels, Fares and Raju find a strong 
positive correlation between agriculture’s share of GDP and the incidence of child labor 
worldwide: a one percentage point increase in the share of agriculture in GDP is 
associated with a 3.2 percent increase in the share of children working (Fares and Raju 
2007, 13). Moreover, agriculture is primarily a rural economic activity that requires more 
involvement and labor than the economic activities of the urban environment. 
Consequently, children in rural areas tend to work more and for longer hours: out of 55 
MICS countries, 31 percent of rural children 5-14 are engaged in market work compared 
to only 19 percent in urban areas (Edmonds 2007, 19). Domestic work is more prevalent 
in rural areas and the incidence of unpaid market work is nearly double in rural areas 
(Edmonds 2007, 19). Market work is much more common in urban areas since there is 
both a higher population and greater wealth in cities. 
Whether in rural or urban areas, domestic work dominates global child labor 
according to economist Erik Edmonds. Edmonds finds that 65 percent of children 5-14 
reports working in domestic work while only 23 percent participate in market work 
(Edmonds 2007, 19). Children work more hours per week in domestic rather than market 
work, and because girls are much more likely to participate in domestic work, this finding 
supports the aforementioned conclusion that global statistics grossly underestimate the 
incidence of female child labor. Using UNICEF’s MICS4 statistics from 55 countries, 
  
4 MICS is the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey is a household survey used by UNICEF to assist countries 
monitor the situation of a country’s women and children. The countries include Albania, Georgia, 
Macedonia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Montenegro, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Bosnia and 
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Edmonds highlights the fact that countries with the highest prevalence of work outside of 
the household also have the highest rate of work inside the household. Sierra Leone has 
the highest rate of children working outside the household and second highest rate of 
work inside the household (Edmonds 2007, 16). These statistics illustrate the incapacity 
of many low-income countries to regulate child labor due to weak institutions and legal 
infrastructure. Furthermore, this phenomenon highlights the inherent challenges in 
implementing and enforcing the international laws that protect the rights of working 
children. 
International Legislation
A large body of international legislation sets minimum age standards for 
employment and seeks to protect children from working in hazardous conditions. The 
first of these was the Minimum Age (Industry) Convention of 1919, which resulted from 
the high incidence of child labor during the Industrial Revolution. At the core of child 
labor legislation is the ILO Minimum Age Convention (No. 138) of 1973. Convention 
138 mandated that signatories establish a minimum age of employment and restrictions 
on working hours as well as pursue policies to abolish child labor. Member parties 
explicitly agreed that the minimum age of employment would not be “less than the age of 
completion of compulsory schooling, and, in any case, shall not be less than 15 years of 
age” (ILO 1973, 2). One of the most recent pieces of legislation was the ILO Worst 
Forms of Child Labor Convention (No. 182) adopted in 1999. Under the terms of this 
    
Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia, Lao, Mongolia, Thailand, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Burundi, Kenya, Malawi, 
Somalia, Algeria, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, Djibouti, Palestinians in 
Lebanon, Sudan, Palestinians in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Morocco, Bangladesh, Belize, Dominican Republic,
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Suriname, Cuba, Guyana, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, Gambia, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe, Togo, Central African 
Republic, Ghana and Niger. Source: UNICEF.
36
Convention, children are defined as all those under the age of 18 in order to maximize the 
scope of this legal protection. All members parties are to determine their own definitions 
of “activities likely to harm to health, safety, or morals of the child” according to cultural 
and social standards (ILO 1999,1). As a result of the disparate standards of the world’s 
many countries, the parameters and effects of Convention 182 are often ambiguous. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was adopted by the United 
Nations (UN) in 1989 and came into force in 1990. Every UN member has ratified the 
CRC except for the U.S. and Somalia. The CRC outlines the social, economic, and 
cultural rights of all persons under 18. It seeks to protect children from situations that are 
not in their best interest and upholds parental responsibility for children’s welfare. Article 
32 is the most significant article in the context of child labor and begins: 
State parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from economic 
exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to 
interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or 
physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development (UN 1989, 9).
All signatories have committed to take political and social action to ensure that children 
have access to education and protection from participating in hazardous economic 
activities. This includes setting a minimum legal age for work, to be established 
domestically in each nation; regulating the hours and conditions of employment; and 
punishing firms and individuals who violate these laws (UN 1989, 10). The modern 
international system has enabled the creation of these agreements to target low-income, 
low-productivity countries that continue to utilize working children in the production of 
goods for export, however, child labor has not been historically endemic to only low-
income countries.
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Economic Theories of Child Labor
There were more child workers during the Industrial Revolution in 19th century 
England than the total number of children engaged in economic activity in 1998, 
excluding middle Africa (Basu and Van 1998, 414). In 1851, 36.6 percent of boys 10-14 
and 19.9 percent of girls of the same age range worked in England even though 
legislation prohibited their labor market participation (Basu and Van 1998, 414). Thus, 
despite England’s high growth rates during this epoch, a highly significant portion of the 
child population worked. This economic situation may seem paradoxical to the average 
reader who intuitively attributes child labor to poverty, but, in contrast, it highlights that a 
broad array of social, cultural and economic factors interact to engender children’s 
participation in economic activities. Though there are disagreements within academia as 
to what causes children to work, economics are integral to any analysis of child labor 
because wages and labor participation are pillars of all functioning economies. There are 
two schools of thought regarding the root of child labor within the economic literature. 
One school of economics believes that child labor causes poverty vis-à-vis the 
intergenerational transmission of low levels of education, i.e. the deficit of human capital 
accumulation, creating a so-called “child labor trap” (Wahba 2003). The other vein 
asserts that poverty causes child labor by creating economic constraints within 
households that make the economic activity of children optimal or even necessary for 
survival. 
Macro and micro-economic analyses of the relationship between poverty and the 
incidence of child labor widely vary upon their conclusions. On the macroeconomic
level, a number of economists provide data demonstrating a strong and negative 
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correlation between national income level (GDP) and child labor worldwide (Beegle, 
Dehejia, and Gatti. 2002; Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005; Orazem and Gunnersson 2003). In 
their cross-country analysis of child labor, scholars Erik Edmonds and Nina Pavcnik find 
that variation in GDP per capita explains 73 percent of the variation in the economic 
activities of children (Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005, 210). A World Bank-sponsored study 
conducted by economists Peter Orazem and Victoria Gunnersson finds that the 
correlation coefficient between child economic activity rates and GDP per capita across 
countries is -0.82 (Fares and Raju 2007, 12). In 1995, the incidence of child labor was 2.3 
percent among countries in the upper quartile of GDP per capita and 34 percent among 
countries in the lowest quartile of GDP per capita (Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti 2002, 1). In 
the world’s poorest countries, or those in the 25th percentile of GDP per capita (roughly 
$1,200), a $100 increase in GDP per capita is associated with a 4.7 percent decrease in 
the share of children working (Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti 2002, 1). These findings 
highlight the robust impact of economic growth in reducing child labor and demonstrate 
the increased import of policies to achieve economic progress in the lowest-income 
countries. This contemporary data is consistent with the historical observation that child 
labor has drastically declined in countries that have experienced high levels of economic 
growth, i.e. Britain, China, and the U.S. Unlike the significant negative correlation 
between income level and child labor globally, household-level analyses produce variant 
results that demonstrates the influence of social, cultural, and institutional factors on a 
household’s labor market decisions. 
Positive Correlation between Poverty and Child Labor
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In 1960, University of Chicago economist Theodore W. Schultz first posited that 
households decide whether or not to send their children to work or school by weighing 
the relative returns between foregone wage contributions of children in the short-run and 
returns on human capital formulation in the long-run (Schultz 1960, 571). In their 
seminal 1998 paper, Kaushik Basu and Pham Hoang Van created one of the most 
influential economic models of child labor. Basu and Van assert that household income 
level is the primary determinant of child labor and that parents do not want their children 
to work, thus if household incomes rise, children work less. In this model, there can be 
multiple equilibria in the labor market: one in which wages are low and children work 
and another in which wages are high and children do not work (Basu and Van 1998, 413). 
If adult wages are low, more children will be forced to work in order to complement the 
adult earnings in their household and reach a subsistence income level. If adult wages are 
high, there is no need for parents to send their children to work. This model rests upon 
two assumptions: the Luxury Axiom and the Substitution Axiom. The Luxury Axiom 
states: “A family will send the children to the labor market only if the family’s income 
from non-child labor sources drops very low” (Basu and Van1998, 416). This Axiom is 
based upon the assumption that non-work, or children’s education and leisure, is a luxury 
good that only the non-poor can afford as well as the idea that parents make household 
labor decisions based on altruism and do not wish their children to work. The 
Substitution Axiom upholds that from a firm’s point of view, child labor is a substitute 
for adult labor (Basu and Van 1998, 416).
Consequently, the child wage determines the firm’s demand for effective labor 
because adults and children are substitutes in the market. Therefore, child labor market 
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participation depresses adult wage and makes child labor necessary (Edmonds 2007, 36). 
In industrialized countries with multiple equilibria and high productivity, children do not 
participate in the labor market because parents are able to support their children due to a 
higher wage rate. Contrarily, low-income countries with an excessive labor supply, little 
technological innovation or capital investment, have an unproductive labor force that 
creates a new market equilibrium where child labor is necessary. In this scenario, 
children’s participation in the labor market creates an excess supply of labor that 
depresses adult wages and creates poverty. This low-wage equilibrium characterizes 
Europe during the Industrial Revolution at the end of the 19th century. The labor market 
in low-income countries is distinguished by having only one equilibrium and thus, when 
a government imposes a legislative ban on child labor, adult wages increase, however, 
they still remain less than the level they would be without the participation of children in 
the labor market. As a result, all households are worse off as they cannot complement the 
low adult wage with child labor wages. 
In these low-income countries, governments often attempt to eliminate child labor 
vis-à-vis policies that aim to provide a more equitable distribution of resources and 
increase household wealth. Economists Kenneth A. Swinnerton and Carol Ann Rogers, 
however, find that in low-productivity countries, i.e. those with a real GDP per worker of 
$10,000 or less, government policies that redistribute income will not reduce child labor 
and may even increase the number of working children (Swinnerton and Rogers 1992, 2). 
The reasoning behind this concept is that the poorest families will benefit from the more 
equal distribution of resources, but not enough to withdraw their children from the labor 
market. Meanwhile, wealthier families on the margin of poverty may experience a 
41
decrease in their household incomes and may be forced to send their children to work. 
Swinnerton and Rogers claim that in high-productivity countries, income inequality 
causes child labor and consequently, income redistribution will be effective in curtailing 
the incidence of child labor. In low-productivity countries, governments should focus 
their policy efforts on increasing productivity regardless of its impact on equity. Outside 
of this model, if policymakers do not take equity into account in their legislative 
decisions then it seems inevitable that destitute families will never be able to escape from 
the chains of poverty and its many symptoms including child labor. 
Households in these low-growth, low-productivity economies whose children 
must work in order to reach a subsistence income level are said to be caught in a so-
called “child labor trap” as working children are inhibited from human capital 
accumulation, i.e. education. A number of empirical studies support the “child labor 
trap.” Using data collected from Egypt, Jackline Wahba (2003) finds that the child of a 
parent who was a child laborer has a higher probability of being a laborer than the child 
of a parent who was not a child laborer. Patrick M. Emerson’s and André Portela Souza 
(2003) research based on Brazilian labor statistics concludes that having worked as a 
child has a larger impact on whether or not an adult’s child will work than the fact that 
the adult’s household is poor. Parents often do not internalize the long-term detrimental 
effects of sending their children to work because they have neither the luxury of doing so
since short-term income is essential to their survival. Furthermore, parents in low-income 
households do not make resource allocation decisions within a long time horizon as they 
often live “hand-to-mouth” and do not know what the future may bring. Another reason 
parents may not understand the high social costs of child labor is because it is a social 
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norm; therefore, external intervention notwithstanding, there is no reason for parents to 
value their children’s enrollment in school over participation in the labor market which 
gives children practical skills that may enable them to get a higher paying job in the 
future, though certainly will not be comparable to those learned in school. 
In high-income countries where a legislative ban on child labor has become 
endogenous, society believes that educating their children is morally imperative and that 
sending their children to work is immoral, a concept that Basu and Van deem “acquired 
morality”; in countries where child labor is the accepted social norm, “the moral rejection 
of child labor has not yet been acquired” according to Basu and Van (Basu and Van 
1998, 422). Though it is true that child labor is abhorred and legally prohibited in 
wealthier countries, this idea implies that Western morals and social constructs are 
superior and more advanced than their low-income counterparts. Parents in poor 
households are constrained in their labor market decisions due to trade-offs between 
short-run and long-run consumption.  It is often impossible for poor parents to make 
long-term investment decisions as their family’s immediate survival depends on only 
their meager incomes. 
Poverty not only impedes the ability of parents to send their children to school, 
but also prohibits families from allocating resources efficiently. In their influential paper, 
“Is Child Labor Inefficient?” Jean-Marie Baland and James A. Robinson assert that child 
labor is a symptom of poverty and claim that it is Pareto inefficient5 because “parents fail 
to fully internalize its negative effects” (Baland and Robinson 2000, 663). The basic 
assumption of their model is that there is a trade-off between child labor and education. 
  
5 Pareto efficiency is an economic equilibrium in which no individual actor can be made better off without 
making another individual actor worse off. 
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Because long-run returns to human capital accumulation are higher than those of short-
run consumption, child labor is inefficient. When parents have no assets to leave to their 
children and lack access to credit as a substitute for foregone income, they are unable to 
sacrifice their child’s current wage contribution in return for their child’s higher earning 
potential as an adult. In this scenario, parents fail to internalize the negative repercussions 
of sending their child to work instead of school; this is not because they lack altruism 
towards their children, but it is instead because they are unable to invest in the education 
of their children in the short run. Parents do not internalize the negative impact of this 
decision, but their children will in the future. Consequently, child labor is inefficient 
when parents use it as a substitute for a future income transfer from their children or as a 
substitute for borrowing in an imperfect market (Baland and Robinson 2000, 677). The 
conclusion that not sending children to work is a luxury that only the non-poor can afford 
is consistent with Basu and Van’s Luxury Axiom (1998).
Other scholars also provide evidence supporting the strong negative correlation 
between household income level and child participation in the labor market. In his study 
of Vietnam, Edmonds (2003) finds that child labor declines dramatically at the poverty 
line (based on 1993 data) and increases in per capita income explain 80 percent of the 
decline in child labor in households that exit poverty. In their analysis of child labor in 
the global economy, Nina Pavcnik and Edmonds (2005) explain that there is a strong 
negative relationship between household living standards and the incidence of child 
labor. They conclude, “Child labor seems highly responsive to unexpected changes in the 
family’s economic environment,” therefore mitigating household income volatility may 
decrease the likelihood that children will work (Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005, 209). In 
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contrast, a number of economists provide evidence which suggests that there is a weak 
correlation between household income level and child labor, and instead attribute the 
incidence of child labor to a variety of other economic, social and cultural variables.
Weak Relationship Between Poverty and Child Labor 
In his study of Pakistan and Peru, economist Ranjan Ray (2000) finds an 
insignificant correlation between household income and child labor, although he does 
find a negative and highly significant relationship between child labor and educational 
attainment. Ray highlights that divergent cultures and community structures across 
countries create different interactions between adult and child labor. According to his 
data, adult males and children are “substitutes” in Peruvian household labor market 
decisions while adult female and child labor are “complements” in Pakistan (Ray 2000, 
11). This implies that as adult male wages increase in Peru, children are less likely to 
work while as female adult wages increase in Pakistan, children are more likely to work. 
The complementary nature of adult female and child labor in Pakistan is inconsistent with 
Basu and Van’s assumption of parental altruism in their Substitution Axiom (Ray 2000, 
12). In Pakistan, if adult female wages increase mothers are more likely to take their 
children, usually girls, to work with them. Ray attributes this phenomenon to “the lack of 
good schools and child care facilities in Pakistan” and posits that there is a “close causal 
link between a deteriorating community infrastructure and rising child labor” (Ray 2000, 
12). Children in non-poor households are much more likely to be enrolled in school than
their poor counterparts which suggests that Basu and Van’s Luxury Axiom is true in the 
context of child education (i.e. education is a luxury good that only the non-poor can 
afford to consume) (Ray 2000, 16). The negative, highly significant correlation between 
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child employment and education implies that child labor is the greatest obstacle to school 
attendance which keeps children caught in a “child labor trap” through the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty (Ray 2000, 16).
It is interesting that Ray finds that Peruvian children work and attend school 
while more children, especially older girls, drop out of school completely to enter the 
labor market in Pakistan. This discrepancy suggests that cultural factors and the 
availability of quality schools have a large role in determining whether or not a working 
child, especially a girl, goes to school. Edmonds and Pavcnik assert that most children 
who work also attend school and UNICEF estimates that nearly 74 percent of working 
children also attend school (Orazem and Gunnarsson 2006). As a caveat to this data, 
Fares and Raju find that countries with higher rates of child labor also have higher rates 
of children working and not attending school (Fares and Raju 2007, 7). Despite their 
enrollment, economist George Psacharopoulos concludes that child labor reduces 
educational attainment by an average of two years and greatly contributes to grade 
repetition in Bolivia and Brazil (Psacharopoulos 1997, 377). Ray’s data implies that in 
order to increase the likelihood that children will go to school instead of participating in 
economic activities, investments must be made to improve social and community 
infrastructure (i.e. the increased provision of public goods such as education, water, 
sanitation, electricity) and living conditions. As Edmonds and Pavcnik suggest, poor local 
institutions may leave children with few available options besides work and thus, 
improving local schools provides children with an alternative to work or idleness 
(Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005, 209). Economist Kiran Bhatty (1998) highlights the 
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influence of societal factors such as an aversion to idleness in his study of India. He 
finds:
Income and related variables do not seem to have any direct significant effect on 
children’s work input […] it is not a financial imperative that forces children to 
work […] children are often put to work as a deterrent to idling rather than as an 
economic necessity (Bhatty 1998, 1734).6
Avoiding idleness is a particularly useful in explaining the high incidence of child labor 
in urban areas and slums where idle children often fall victim to drug use and organized 
crime. Ray’s data from Peru and Pakistan also demonstrates that increasing levels of 
adult female education and awareness significantly reduces child labor (Ray 2000, 18). 
Educating women about the ills of child labor and the benefits of sending their children to 
school is a powerful tool to diminish the incidence of child labor. Microfinance 
institutions and NGOs may provide this education, however, the effectiveness of these 
social education programs on the share of working children depends upon the aims of the 
particular organization and the area’s vulnerability to exogenous shocks. 
Despite the empirical findings that macroeconomic income growth has a positive 
effect on eliminating child labor at the global level, several economists provide further 
evidence that the same does not hold true on a micro-level. Rogers and Swinnerton 
(2003) demonstrate that when poor households lack access to credit, an increase in 
parental income can perversely cause child labor to rise. This model analyzes household 
resource allocations in two phases: first, childhood in which a child is completely 
dependent upon his parents, and second, the child’s adulthood in which the child moves 
out of the house and is self-sufficient. Once a household reaches a certain income level, 
children no longer see the need to transfer assets to their parents when they are older. 
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However, their parents would still like a repayment for the investments they made in the 
child’s youth. At this increased income level, parents anticipate that their children will 
not repay them in the future and therefore maximize present utility by sending their 
children to work. This counterintuitive argument may not hold true in the real world, but 
it does highlight the significance of short-term and long-term tradeoffs between a child’s 
economic contribution to the household and a child’s human capital accumulation. 
There are a number of empirical studies supporting Rogers and Swinnerton’s 
(2003) conclusion that an increase in household wealth makes parents more likely to send 
their children to work. Based upon data from Vietnam, Edmonds and Turk (2004) find 
that households that start their own businesses are more likely use child labor. Data 
collected by Ramesh Kanbargi and P.M. Kulkarni (1991) in rural India suggests that 
there may be a positive relationship between a household’s number of cattle and the 
incidence of child labor. Similarly, economists Sonia Bhalotra and Christopher Heady 
(2003) conclude that children who live in households with greater land ownership tend to 
work more based on data from Ghana and Pakistan. The explanation for these findings is 
that labor market imperfections create the opportunity for households to use their labor 
endowments, including child labor, more productively to augment their household 
income level (Basu and Tzannatos 2003, 159). Bhalotra and Heady appropriately label 
this positive correlation the “Wealth Paradox,” for if income level and child labor are 
inversely correlated as so many scholars posit, then once household income reaches a 
certain threshold child labor should decrease. Though this may be true in a small sample 
of case studies conducted around the world, there is a significant negative correlation 
between income, i.e. GDP per capita, and the incidence of child labor at the global level. 
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As household income levels increase parents may be less likely to send their children to 
work although, as chapter three of this thesis highlights, this is not always the case.
Positive Relationship between Credit Constraints and Child Labor
Credit enables households to substitute foregone consumption in the short term 
for long-term investments. The poorly developed financial and legal infrastructures 
characteristic of low-income countries prevent the majority of the population from 
obtaining credit, savings and insurance. Weak property rights impede the ability of the 
poor to transform their dead capital, i.e. collateralizable assets and property, into fungible 
assets such as collateral for credit which mitigates the impact of exogenous, negative 
shocks such as loss of employment, death, natural disaster, fire and crop failure, on 
household consumption. As a result, if a negative exogenous shock suddenly decreases 
household income, poor households may be forced to send their children to work as a 
substitute for credit. Little empirical research on the direct relationship between credit 
constraints and child labor exists to date, though a growing number of scholars have 
attempted to capture the effect of access to credit on the likelihood that a household will 
send its children to work. Hanan G. Jacoby and Emmanuel Skoufias (1997) indirectly 
demonstrate that “poor households lacking access to credit markets might draw upon 
child labor when faced with negative income shocks” in their empirical study of six 
Indian villages (in Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti 2002, 6). The authors find that “fluctuations 
in school attendance” indicate that children’s labor is “used by households as self-
insurance” (Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti 2002, 6). Using school attendance as a proxy for 
child labor, however, assumes that work and school are substitutes, which is not always 
the case.
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Scholars Katherine Beegle, Rajeev Dehejia, and Roberta Gatti (2004) employ 
more correlative variables in order to assess the relationship between credit constraints 
and child labor. Using collateralizable assets7 as a proxy for access to credit, Beegle and 
her colleagues find that households with collateralizable assets are better able to offset 
the negative effects of income shocks in the Kagera region of Tanzania (Beegle, Dehejia, 
and Gatti 2004, 2). This coping capacity could be due to the “Wealth Effect,” or 
“unobservables such as a household’s social network,” however, when these effects are 
controlled for their results remain robust (Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti 2004, 2). In a cross-
country study, Dehejia and Gatti provide some of the most compelling evidence that there 
is a significant negative correlation between child labor and credit constraints by utilizing 
the extent of financial intermediation8 as a proxy for credit constraints (Dehejia and Gatti 
2002, 2). In countries with “underdeveloped” financial markets, income volatility has a 
much more significant impact on the incidence of child labor than countries with well-
developed markets (Dehejia and Gatti 2002, 2). Because child labor is more prevalent in 
countries with “underdeveloped” financial markets, this observation suggests, “that 
households resort to their children’s work to cope with income shocks” (Dehejia and 
Gatti 2002, 2). Because poor households lack the assets and access to credit necessary to 
absorb exogenous decreases in their income, parents are forced to utilize the household’s 
only alternative productive capacity: their children’s labor. 
Elaborating upon Van and Basu’s Luxury Axiom, economist Priya Ranjan 
upholds, “It is a combination of poverty and missing market for loans against future 
  
7 Collateralizable assets are represented by the value of durable goods such as radios, bicycles, fans, lamps, 
and pots and exclude cash holdings, business, and land value in this model (Beegle et. al 2004, 11). 
8 Financial intermediation is determined in their model as the share of private credit issued by banks to 
GDP (Beegel, Dehejia, and Gatti 2004, 20).
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earnings that generates the phenomenon of child labor” (Ranjan 1999, 100). Parents in 
poor households cannot afford to withdraw their children from the labor market and incur 
the loss of their wage contribution because there is simply “no market for loans against 
future earnings” (Ranjan 1999, 100). Consequently, despite high returns to human 
capital, it is economically infeasible for parents to invest in their children’s education 
because “borrowing against the future earnings of children is [simply] impossible” 
(Ranjan 2001, 82). If parents have access to loans or receive school subsidies which 
enable them to offset the economic losses incurred by investing in their children’s 
education, then they may withdraw their children from work. Dehejia and Gatti support 
this hypothesis with empirical evidence that “a move from the 25th to the 75th percentile 
of access to credit in a poor country is associated with a 4.2 percent decrease in child 
labor” (Dehejia and Gatti 2002, 13). In contrast, in a report sponsored by the 
Understanding Children’s Work joint project between the ILO, UNICEF, and the World 
Bank, scholars Lorenzo Guarcello, Fabrizia Mealli, and Furio Camilo Rosati find that 
credit constraints have a larger impact on “household investment decision in human 
capital, rather than children’s labor force participation” (Guarcello, Mealli, and Rosati 
2002, 21). Thus, having access to credit increases the likelihood that parents will send 
their children to school instead of work while, “shocks, on the contrary, directly affect 
children’s labor force participation, most likely because of the need to compensate for 
unexpected loss of resources” (Guarcello, Mealli, and Rosati 2002, 21).
Despite their divergent variables, sample sizes, and conclusions, all of these 
reports demonstrate that there is a correlation between income shocks, credit constraints 
and child labor that has clear policy implications: providing poor families with access to 
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credit may reduce the likelihood that they will have to send their children to work in 
order to maintain a subsistence level of income. Up to this point economists have only 
indirectly measured the effect of credit constraints on child labor because it is difficult to 
capture a household’s access to credit with a single quantitative variable. The aim of this 
thesis is to analyze the direct relationship between the elimination of credit constraints 
and the incidence of child labor in Bangladesh. 
Conclusion 
The crux of these economic models is that poor households face a trade-off 
between short and long run economic and social costs upon which their family’s survival 
may depend. In the short run, parents may be forced to send their children to work 
because they lack access to credit or savings as substitutes for the wages foregone by 
investing in their children’s education. In some places, child labor may be socially 
normalized to such an extent that parents do not internalize the detrimental effects of 
child labor on the well-being and future earning capacity of their children if they go to 
school. Economic models are useful in analyzing household labor market decisions and 
demonstrating a correlation between child labor and a number of economic indicators, 
however, individuals cannot always be assumed to be rational actors. Political, social and 
cultural factors all play a role in determining whether or not a child works, attends school 
or does both. If a government has poor institutions and infrastructure, the quality of 
education and living standards may be low and children will be less likely to attend 
school. If child labor is the norm, then households may value the perceived life skills 
acquired by work over education and society may not view child labor as unacceptable. 
Finally, if parents worked as children, then they are more likely to send their children to 
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work, due to either economic or personal reasons, and believe that their children are 
acquiring important life skills through employment. The myriad causes of child labor 
cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. Nevertheless, the economic theories presented in this 
chapter are integral to understanding household labor market decisions and subsequently 
enact legislative policies to more effectively diminish the incidence of child labor. In the 
next chapter, I will use these studies and models to untangle the complex relationship 
between microfinance and child labor in Bangladesh. 
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Chapter 3: The Relationship Between Microfinance and Child Labor in Bangladesh 
Home to thousands of microfinance programs and millions of working children, 
Bangladesh is the ideal location to study the relationship between the two. Though there 
is an abundance of research documenting the impact of microfinance on household 
income and consumption levels and the factors that lead children to work, to the author’s 
knowledge, there are no studies on the relationship between the two. Interestingly 
enough, there are many overlapping factors that contribute to both the pervasiveness of 
microfinance and child labor in Bangladesh including: geography, culture, demographics, 
poor governance, and inadequate access to education. Though scholars and policymakers 
uphold Bangladesh as a prime example of the capacity of microfinance programs to 
diminish poverty and improve household welfare, access to credit can potentially 
exacerbate the endemic child labor problem there.  
General Overview
Bangladesh is a land of deltas surrounded by India and bordering Myanmar in the 
southeast. In this aqueous setting, approximately 145 million people compete over land in 
a territory equivalent to the size of Iowa making it one of the most densely populated 
countries in the world. There are three main seasons in Bangladesh: summer, which is hot 
and humid, a mild winter, and monsoon season during which 20-60 percent of the 
country floods. As a consequence of its geographical position in the Bay of Bengal, 
Bangladesh is extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in sea levels and natural disasters such 
as cyclones, typhoons and earthquakes. In September 2007, a cyclone ravaged the 
country killing more than 3,500 people and rendering millions more homeless. 
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Unfortunately, Cyclone Sidr was the latest of the numerous hardships the people of 
Bangladesh have faced since the departure of British colonial forces from India.
Figure 3.1: Map of Bangladesh
  
Source: http://www.chaitanyaconsult.in/chaitanya/vision/bdmap.jpg
After gaining independence from the British in 1947, India, inhabited primarily of 
Hindus, and Pakistan, dominated by Muslims, emerged as two independent nation-states. 
Pakistan comprised two regions straddling India known as East and West Pakistan. 
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People in East Pakistan felt politically neglected and economically exploited. The central 
government’s ignorance of victims of a catastrophic flood in East Pakistan in 1970, 
exacerbated tensions and incited a full-scale rebellion against the central government in 
Islamabad. In 1971, West Pakistani soldiers brutally suppressed a resistance movement in 
East Pakistan utilizing torture, rape, death squads, and murder; Bangladeshis refer to this 
attack as genocide. In one night alone, roving death squads murdered 7,000 people in 
Dhaka. Scholars estimate that somewhere between one and three million Bengalis were 
killed between 1969 and 1971 under President Yahya Khan’s reign over the Pakistani 
territories (Rummel 1994, 331). In order to escape this violence, ten million refugees fled 
to India where dissidents formed a provisional government determined to liberate the 
people of East Pakistan from their oppressor to the west. Inhabitants of East Pakistan 
waged war on the central government not only to assert their economic and political 
autonomy, but also, and perhaps more importantly, in order to claim the right to speak 
Bengali, not Urdu, as the national language. In 1971, a pre-emptive Pakistani air attack 
and a diminishing capacity to absorb/support the huge refugee population catapulted 
India into the war on behalf of Bangladesh. After only eleven days, the Indian army 
crushed that of West Pakistan and on December 16, 1971, Bangladesh was born.  
In 1974, the monsoon season caused excessive floods that led to famine. The 
death toll according to the Bangladeshi government was merely 26,000 people, however, 
most scholars estimate that at least a million people died as a result of food shortages. 
Military coups and martial law continued until President Zia established democracy in 
1979. In 1981, military leaders reclaimed their authority and political instability ensued 
until 1991, when Bangladesh truly became a democracy. Bangladesh is a parliamentary 
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democracy known for its elite-driven politics and rampant corruption now governed by 
an interim caretaker military government. One character that distinguishes Bangladesh 
from other Muslim nations is its moderation. Though 88 percent of its population is 
Muslim, language is at the heart of the Bangladeshi national identity (BBS 2006). During 
the War of Partition in 1971, the people of Bangladesh fought fiercely for the freedom to
speak Bangla; 98 percent of citizens speak it (BBS 2006). This cultural cohesion may 
have earned Bangladeshis political autonomy, but it did not engender economic success. 
Figure 1 presents political risk indicators from the International Country Risk Guide that 
illustrate the high levels of corruption, crime, military involvement, poverty and 
employment which render the country a politically, “very high risk” and detract from 
foreign investment (The PRS Group, Inc. 2008). 
Table 3.1: Governance Indicators in terms of Political Risk Ratings 
SOURCE: The PRS Group, Inc. International Country Risk Guide, Feb. 2008.
Variable
Political Risk 
Rating Scale
Bureaucracy Quality (L) 2 4 = high  
Corruption (F) 2.5 0 = most corrupt 6 = least corrupt
Democratic Accountability 
(K) 3 0 = autarchies 4 = alternating democracies
Government Stability (A) 8 12 = most stable 
Law & Order (I) 2.5
0 = very high crime rates and ignorance of 
laws 6 = strong law and order
Legislative Strength 3 4 = high quality
Military in Politics (G) 1.5 0 = highest degree of military involvement
Political Risk Rating 49.5 0.0% - 49.9% = very high risk
Poverty 0 0 = very high risk 
Risk for GDP per Head 0
0 = up to 9.9 % of avg. estimated total GDP 
of all countries covered by ICRG
Unemployment 0 0 = very high risk 
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Table 3.2: World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) of 
Governance
Variable 2005
CPIA quality of public administration rating (1=low to 6=high) 3
CPIA social protection rating (1=low to 6=high) 4
CPIA structural policies cluster average (1=low to 6=high) 3
CPIA transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating 
(1=low to 6=high) 2
SOURCE: World Bank Development Indicators Database 
Economy
Bangladesh is a young country whose economic progress has been impressive 
over the past few decades, but remains an impoverished nation relative to global 
standards. Even though Bangladesh experienced an average annual growth rate of 4.8 
percent between 1991 and 2000, 80 percent of the population continues to live on less 
than $2 a day (Bangladesh Bank). Because of the abundance of cheap labor, services 
accounted from 52 percent of Bangladeshi GDP in 2007, with manufacturing and 
agriculture contributing 27 and 22 percent respectively (World Bank Development 
Indicators 2007).
Table 3.3: Economic Indicators 2000-2006
Variable 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 26 22 21 20 20
GDP growth (annual %) 6 5 6 6 7
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 365 399 416 433 454
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 4 3 4 4 5
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 international $) 1543 1685 1757 1828 1916
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 19 20 21 23 24
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 14 14 15 17 18
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 2 6 9 7 7
Manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports) 91 92 90 .. .
SOURCE: World Bank Development Indicators Database 
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Development Indicators
Unfortunately, last year’s Cyclone Sidr exacerbated the government’s already 
inadequate capacity to govern and reversed much of the developmental progress which 
resulted from four years of economic growth. According to the most recent United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) report, Bangladesh ranks 138th out of 174 
countries in terms of GDP per capita; 93rd out of 108 on the human poverty index; and 
140th out of 177 countries (for which data is available) on its annual Human Development 
Index (HDI) with a score of 0.547 on a scale from 0 to 1 (UNDP 2007). The HDI 
composites three aspects of human development including life expectancy; adult literacy 
and primary, secondary and tertiary school enrollment; and purchasing power parity 
(PPP) and income.9 Bangladesh has a relatively low GINI coefficient of 0.33 (with 0 
corresponding to perfect equality and 1 to perfect inequality) because the majority of the 
population lives in poverty (World Bank 2007). Because 74 percent of the population 
lives in rural areas where access to health care is limited, the life expectancy is 64 years 
and 40.5 percent of the population is not expected to survive to the age of 40 according to 
the HPI-110 UNDP index (UNDP 2007). Food security is a major problem for extremely 
  
9 The UNDP explains: “The HDI provides a composite measure of three dimensions of human 
development: living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy), being educated (measured by 
adult literacy and enrolment at the primary, secondary and tertiary level) and having a decent standard of 
living (measured by purchasing power parity, PPP, income). The HDI measures the average progress of a 
country in human development. The Human Poverty Index for developing countries (HPI-1), focuses on 
the proportion of people below a threshold level in the same dimensions of human development as the 
human development index - living a long and healthy life, having access to education, and a decent 
standard of living.” (UNDP 2007 “Bangladesh: The Human Development Index: Going Beyond Income” 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_BGD.html)
10 “The HPI-1 measures severe deprivation in health by the proportion of people who are not expected to 
survive past age 40. Education is measured by the adult illiteracy rate. And a decent standard of living is 
measured by the unweighted average of people without access to an improved water source and the 
proportion of children under age 5 who are underweight for their age… By looking beyond income 
deprivation, the HPI-1 represents a multi-dimensional alternative to the $1 a day (PPP US$) poverty 
measure .The index is not in any sense a comprehensive measure of human development. It does not, for 
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poor citizens, for 48 percent of children aged 0-5 is underweight for their age, placing the 
country second to Nepal in this category (UNDP 2007). As a result of both cultural and 
religious mores, women continue to face discrimination socially and economically; 
Bangladesh ranks 93rd among 108 developing countries on the gender-related 
development index (GDI)11 which seeks to quantify inequalities between men and 
income (UNDP 2007). These statistics illustrate the widespread poverty that has led to 
the ubiquity of both microfinance programs and child labor.
    
example, include important indicators such as gender or income inequality and more difficult to measure 
indicators like respect for human rights and political freedoms. What it does provide is a broadened prism 
for viewing human progress and the complex relationship between income and well-being.” (Ibid) 
11 “The gender-related development index (GDI), introduced in Human Development Report 1995, 
measures achievements in the same dimensions using the same indicators as the HDI but captures 
inequalities in achievement between women and men. It is simply the HDI adjusted downward for gender 
inequality. The greater the gender disparity in basic human development, the lower is a country's GDI 
relative to its HDI.” (Ibid)
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Table 3.4: Development Indicators
Variable 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006
Aid (% of GNI) 2 3 2 2
Aid per capita (current US$) 9 10 10 9
Adult Literacy Rate, Male , % (UNESCO) 50 50 50
Adult Literacy Rate, Female, % (UNESCO) 31 31 31
Adult Literacy Rate, Total, % (UNESCO) 41 41 41
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with 
access) 33 39
Improved sanitation facilities, rural (% of rural pop. with 
access) 27 35
Improved sanitation facilities, urban (% of urban pop. with 
access) 53 51
Improved water source (% of population with access) 74 74
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 62 64
Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population) 30 30
Malnutrition prevalence, height for age (% of children 
under 5) 45 43
Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children 
under 5) 48 48
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) 92 73
Poverty headcount ratio at $1 a day (PPP) (% of 
population)12 41
Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of 
population) 84
Rural population (% of total population) 77 76 75 75 74
Urban population (% of total) 23 24 25 25 26
Source: World Bank Development Indicators Database 
Role of the Government: Financial Sector
One crucial element in analyzing both child labor and microfinance in Bangladesh 
is the corruption, weakness and ineffectiveness of the central government. Local 
government officials have meager resources with which to serve the needs of their 
constituents and few repercussions for inaction. As a consequence of its highly 
centralized bureaucratic structure, corruption, low budget and relative youth, Bangladesh 
  
12 “The head-count index of poverty measures the percentage of households with per person consumption 
below the poverty line. The head-count index does not measure the depth of poverty (that is, how far the 
poor are from the poverty line). It is nevertheless the most common measure used to indicate the extent of 
poverty in a population” (Khandker 1998, 56). 
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lacks the financial and legal infrastructure requisite for widespread participation in the 
formal financial sector. Commercial banks are limited to wealthy clients and businesses; 
the average citizen struggles to access formal financial services due to the absence of 
local branches in rural areas and a lack of education and information regarding credit. 
According to the World Bank, Bangladesh scores 2 (on a scale where 6 indicates higher 
levels of information) on the Credit Information Index which “measures the scope, access 
and quality of credit information available through public registries or private bureaus” 
(World Bank 2008). To illustrate the unavailability of credit information for Bangladeshi 
citizens in OECD countries the Credit Information Index averages 4.8 percent (World 
Bank 2008). 
Furthermore, the fact that four state-owned banks run the Bangladeshi banking 
system and control approximately 50 percent of assets within the country demonstrates 
the exclusion of poor citizens in the formal financial sector (Credit and Development 
Forum 2006, 3). NGOs have filled the vacuum created by poor governance and provide 
financial and social services including credit and savings, health care and education. 
Figure 5 highlights the exorbitant costs of starting a legal business in the formal 
marketplace as well as the lack of development of the Bangladeshi financial sector and 
unavailability of credit information for potential borrowers. 
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Table 3.5: Financial Sector Indicators
Variable 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006
Cost of business start-up procedures (% of GNI per 
capita) . 122 106 94 88
CPIA financial sector rating (1=low to 6=high) . . . 3 .
Credit information availability index (0=less info to 
6=more info) . . . . 2
SOURCE: World Bank Development Indicators Database 
Role of the Government: Microfinance Programs and Regulation
Though they may remain excluded from the formal economy, most of the poor 
people in Bangladesh now have access to microfinance programs as a result of its high 
success rates and volume.13 In fact, microfinance programs produced such promising 
results that the Bangladeshi government adopted it as part of its rural development 
strategy. In 1982, the government created the Bangladesh Rural Development Board 
(BRDB) which set up cooperatives in poor, rural areas that provided men and women 
with skills and leadership training, savings mobilization, and access to credit (Khandker 
1998, 18). The Canadian International Development Agency donated funds to improve 
and expand the government’s existing rural development project that enabled the creation 
of the Rural Development Project-12 (RD-12) to provide microcredit to the rural poor 
(Khandker 1998, 18). Today government microcredit programs serve approximately 1 
million borrowers at a flat interest rate of 11 percent though the impact and effectiveness 
of these initiatives is ambiguous due to the reliability of available statistics (World Bank 
2006, 21). It is interesting that the government has invested so many financial resources 
in the provision of microcredit instead of working to make the formal financial sector 
  
13 For more information on the importance of integrating the informal sector into the formal economy, see 
chapter one.
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more inclusive, but the Bangladeshi government has never been known for its capacity 
for reform and regulation. 
Despite its breadth and global esteem, the microfinance industry in Bangladesh was 
not regulated until 2006 when the government passed the Micro Credit Regulatory 
Authority Act. The Act established the Micro Credit Regulatory Authority to monitor and
supervise both lending and savings institutions created specifically for the poor 
(Microfinance Gateway 2008). As of 2007, organizations offering microfinance must 
apply for official government certification and will then be subject to the standards 
established by the Regulatory Authority. The Act requires MFIs to fully disclose and 
report all financial activity, to subject themselves to internal audits and inspections, to 
employ directors who meet federal criteria and to establish to create a reserve fund
(Microfinance Gateway 2008). It remains to be seen whether or not the government will, 
in fact, enforce the stipulations put forth in the Micro Credit Regulatory Authority Act. 
The expansiveness of microfinance, inadequate federal funding and a lack of manpower 
pose major obstacles to its implementation though hopefully regulation of the 
microfinance industry will not mimic that of child labor in Bangladesh.
Role of the Government: Regulating Child Labor
In spite of the over 25 laws aimed at protecting working children, NGOs are 
ultimately responsible for monitoring employers, providing working children with access 
to formal and informal education, and ensuring that children do not work in hazardous 
conditions or forced labor. The Ministry of Labor and Employment is the organ 
responsible for monitoring and penalizing violations against the rights of child laborers, 
but it is comprised of only 110 inspectors to monitor about 180,000 registered factories 
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and establishments (U.S. State Department 2001). This lack of manpower means that 
“child labor laws are seldom enforced outside of the [heavily publicized] garment export 
industry,” for according to one ministry official in Dhaka, “There have been no 
prosecutions for violations of child labor laws” (U.S. State Department 2001).
Bangladesh is a signatory to the ILO Conventions on the Worst Forms of Child Labor 
(No. 182), Forced Labor (No. 29), and Abolition of Forced Labor (No. 105) as well as the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Laws setting the minimum age for 
employment vary by sector.
One of the most important and oldest domestic laws regulating child labor in 
Bangladesh is the Employment of Children Act (1938) which prohibits children under the 
age of 12 from working in workshops or factories where hazardous work is performed. 
The Employment of Children Act set a dangerous precedent by exempting family-owned 
and family-run workshops that do not use outside labor from its scope (IPEC/ILO). Even 
though they are not participating in the wage labor market, children who work in the 
family business are still detracted from going to school. Another landmark law, the 
Factory Act (1965) limits children’s work to 5 hours per day between the hours of 7 AM 
and 7 PM. On paper, the Factory Act institutionalized the capacity of children to work 
and attend school; however, the government lacks the manpower, funding and concern to 
enforce these laws. 
Role of the Government: Public Education
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Another area in which the government has failed to fulfill its legislative promises 
is education. Since the 1990s, the Bangladeshi government has launched a number of 
initiatives to encourage parents to send their children to school and achieve universal 
primary education by the year 2015. Despite progress in eliminating gender disparities 
and increasing primary school enrollment, about 30 percent of Bangladeshi children 
never receive a full primary education because 6 percent of children never enter into the 
primary education system and 25 percent drop out (USAID 2007). Moreover, the 
Bangladeshi government spends only 2 percent of total GDP and 14 percent of total 
government expenditure on education (World Bank Development Indicators 2005), the 
lowest rate in South Asia, and 96 percent of this meager amount goes to teachers’ salaries 
(“Report on Primary Education in Bangladesh” 2005, 11).
The Bangladeshi education system also suffers from inequitable access between 
regions, rural and urban areas, gender and household income levels (“Report on Primary 
Education in Bangladesh 2005, 5). Even though primary government schools are 
allegedly free for all citizens, uniform and supply costs can reach 1,000 taka (US $14) 
annually (“Report on Primary Education in Bangladesh” 2005, 11). Consequently, 
children from poor households or with illiterate parents are 24 percent less likely to 
attend school than those from wealthier households with educated parents (“Report on 
Primary Education in Bangladesh” 2005, 11). Even in instances where children can 
access schools, they are generally of poor quality and lack standardization, for there are 
many types of education including formal, non-formal, English-medium, and Bangla-
medium. According to the World Bank, four out of five Bangladeshi children who 
completed five years of primary education failed to attain a minimum learning level 
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(Greaney 1996) and only 44 percent of children continue to enroll in secondary school 
(World Bank Development Indicators 2005). NGOs have filled the vacuum created by 
the government’s failure to invest in primary education by establishing thousands of 
schools throughout the country. The government now relies too heavily upon NGOs to 
provide primary education, which is actually of a much higher quality, and has little 
impetus to direct more federal resources towards education without which long-term, 
sustainable development will be impossible (“Report on Primary Education in 
Bangladesh” 2005). 
Table 3.6: Education Indicators
Variable 2000 2003 2004 2005
Average attendance rate (% of those enrolled in 
school)14 60
Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age 
group) 84 73 76 ..  
Primary school dropout rate, total (% of enrollment) 23.6
Primary education, duration (years) 5 5 5 5
Average time it takes students to complete primary 
education (# of years)15 6.6
Public spending on education, total (% of GDP) 2 2 2 2
Public spending on education, total (% of government 
expenditure) 15 15 15 14
School enrollment, primary (% gross) 109 106 109 ..  
School enrollment, primary (% net) 89 93 94 ..  
School enrollment, primary, female (% gross) 109 107 111 ..  
School enrollment, primary, female (% net) 90 95 96 ..  
School enrollment, primary, male (% gross) 109 105 107 ..  
School enrollment, primary, male (% net) 89 92 93 ..  
School enrollment, secondary (% net) 47 48 44 ..  
SOURCE: World Bank Development Indicators Database
Microfinance Overview
  
14 Campaign for Popular Education (CAMPE) “Quality with Equity: The Primary Education Campaign in 
Bangladesh,” 2004. 
15 Ibid.  
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One consequence of this endemic poverty and inadequate governance is the 
pervasiveness of microfinance programs in Bangladesh. With more MFIs than any other 
country, the most comprehensive analyses of the effect of microfinance on poverty 
alleviation and livelihood originate from Bangladesh. According to a 2005 World Bank 
report, microcredit now serves 24.6 million clients (Credit and Development Forum
2006), or approximately 43 percent of all Bangladeshi households, and about 70 percent 
of poor households (World Bank 2006, iii). NGOs serve 60 percent of microfinance 
clients, or 16.4 million borrowers (Helms 2006, 48), and generally charge a flat interest 
rate of 11-15 percent (S.M. Rahman 2000, 4). Moreover, the four dominant lending 
institutions, Grameen Bank, BRAC, ASA, and Proshika, account for 86.6 percent of all 
borrowers who have amassed $800 million in outstanding loans and approximately $300 
million in savings (World Bank 2006, 18). Microcredit loans average 2500 taka (about 
$35) (S.M. Rahman 2000, 4). Member savings provide 30 percent of the funds for 
microcredit in Bangladesh and the average loan recovery rate overall is 93 percent 
(Credit and Development Forum 2006, 8). Though the majority of funding comes from 
members’ savings and interest, domestic organizations, primarily PKSF, provide 
supplementary financial support. Grants from foreign donors used to comprise a much 
larger portion of the funds used for microfinance in Bangladesh, however, as the industry 
has developed, a greater number of MFIs have become sustainable eliminating much of 
the demand for external financing (Credit and Development Forum 2006, 16). Today, 80 
percent of funding comes from Bangladesh while only 20 percent comes from external 
donors (S.M. Rahman 2000, 9).
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Because funding for MFIs has diversified over the past decade, the microcredit 
market in Bangladesh has become more competitive which has lowered interest rates, 
expanded the number and scope of financial services available and allowed borrowers to 
be more selective in choosing a lender (World Bank 2006, 21). However, as a result of 
the rapid and massive expansion of the microfinance industry over the past two decades, 
Bangladeshi MFIs have shifted their focus from outreach towards becoming financially 
sustainable. In order to attract more donor investments, expand their operations and 
achieve economies of scale to minimize their losses, MFIs work hard to expand their loan 
distribution. According to numerous scholars, the quest of Bangladeshi MFIs and NGOs 
to achieve self-sustainability has come at the expense of monitoring and transparency 
which are crucial to ensuring the financial success of borrowers' enterprises (Aminur 
Rahman 1998, 67). Organizations such as ASA have managed to achieve financial 
sustainability without compromising on the quality of the financial services provided. 
Though there are over more than 1200 microfinance NGOs in Bangladesh today, 200 of 
which have large microcredit programs and 721 of which are classified as MFIs, the four 
most prominent microfinance organizations in Bangladesh are Grameen Bank, BRAC, 
the Palli-Karma Sahayek Foundation (PKSF), ASA and Proshika (Credit and 
Development Forum 2006, 5).16
Grameen Bank
In 1976, economics professor Muhammad Yunus launched an experimental 
project to lend small amounts of his own money to poor women in the southern region of 
Chittagong. Seven years later, the Bangladeshi government officially recognized 
  
16 See appendix 1 for more information on PKSF, ASA, and Proshika. 
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Grameen Bank as a specialized “Bank for the Poor,”17 whose collateral-free, group-based 
lending model has been replicated in more than 100 countries around the world. Yunus 
has been so successful in establishing and replicating microfinance worldwide that he and 
his clients were jointly awarded in the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006. Based on the premise 
that credit is a basic human right, the Grameen Bank is a minimalist MFI created to 
provide small-scale loans to impoverished, rural women to utilize their entrepreneurial 
talent to start or expand their existing income-generating activities. Grameen offers a 
range of financial services including basic, flexible, housing, microenterprise, and 
education loans; savings programs for members and non-members; pension schemes; and 
life and loan insurance policies. Since its inception, the Grameen Bank has disbursed 
over $6 billion USD in loans to nearly 6 million borrowers, 96 percent of whom are 
women, while achieving a repayment rate of 98 percent. As of January 2007, Grameen 
had 122,767 centers in 75,359 villages (Grameen Bank 2007, 1). Grameen Bank 
borrowers own 94 percent of the bank while the government owns the other 6 percent. 
The bank has made a profit every year except for 1983, 1991, and 1992, and in 2005, 
earned a profit of $15.21 million (Grameen Bank 2007, 4).
What distinguishes Grameen Bank from traditional banks is not only its target 
clientele, rural females who own less than .5 an acre of land, but also its is its group-
lending model that uses “social collateral,” i.e. peer pressure and reputation in lieu of 
assets as collateral. In order for women to receive a loan from Grameen, they must form 
small homogenous groups of 5-8 members. One member of the group first receives a loan 
and must demonstrate the capacity to repay it before other members can be eligible to 
  
17 Muhammad Yunus coined the term “Bank for the Poor.” 
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borrow from the bank. Every week, a branch manager visits the borrowers’ village and 
collects loan installments in cash. Each borrower has a ledger in which the area manager 
records her outstanding loans, weekly installments and savings. The crux of Grameen’s 
model is a firm belief in independence and self-sufficiency. As Professor Yunus 
articulates, “All the ingredients for ending poverty of a person always comes neatly 
packaged with the person himself” (Grameen Bank 2007, 2). In response to criticism that 
microfinance does not reach the poorest, in July 2002, Muhammad Yunus launched an 
unprecedented project known as the Struggling Members’ Program that redefined the 
lending process by distributing collateral and interest-free loans to beggars. As of 
February 2007, this unique program has reached over 80,000 of the most vulnerable 
Bangladeshis who attain loans averaging $2 US; nearly 60 percent of these loans have 
been repaid thus far. The success of the Grameen Bank enabled Professor Yunus to 
expand his own entrepreneurial activities to form the Grameen Network comprised of 
sixteen sister companies including Grameen Telecom, Knitwear, Education, Kalyan 
(well-being) and Trust. 
BRAC
In 1972, a year after receiving their independence from Pakistan, Fazel Abed 
founded the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) in order to aid victims 
of the great famine of 1970 and families displaced by the 1971 War of Liberation. Abed’s 
pragmatism and concern for his fellow citizens led to the BRAC’s rapid expansion for it 
is now the largest NGO in Bangladesh and offers myriad health, education, legal and 
social services. In 1976, BRAC began a microcredit program as part of its holistic 
approach to alleviating poverty. Providing the poor with access to credit has never been 
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the primary objective of BRAC, but it has been an integral tool to improve household 
welfare. Since it began its microfinance program, BRAC has loaned over $4 billion and 
currently has 6 million borrowers, 98 percent of whom are women (Morduch and Haley 
2002, 39). Like Grameen Bank, BRAC’s microcredit program has 170,000 Village 
Organizations throughout rural areas in order to collect loan repayments and meet to 
discuss pertinent social and business issues. BRAC’s microfinance program offers more 
than simply loans, but also entrepreneurial and financial training, the formation of 
cooperatives, and integrated informal education programs. 
Challenging the common perception that microfinance excludes the poorest, 
BRAC established the Income Generation for Vulnerable Groups Development (IGVGD) 
Program together with the government of Bangladesh and the World Food Program. 
IGVGD targets the poorest rural women and couples the provision of grain with business 
training and eventually microcredit. Over the past decade, 75 percent of these women are 
no longer considered to be living in absolute poverty and now participate in BRAC’s 
microfinance programs (Morduch and Haley 2002, 39). In 2002, BRAC began a new 
program called “Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction: Targeting the Ultra 
Poor” (CFPR-TUP) which seeks to address the unique needs of the poorest of the poor by 
providing them with business training, asset transfers, group counseling and support and 
essential health care with the hope that they can eventually graduate to participating in 
mainstream microfinance programs. The CFPR-TUP initiative highlights the importance 
of targeting a particular group of poor clients and designing an institutional structure that 
provides the social and financial services they demand.  
Target Clientele
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In order to maximize the effectiveness of microcredit for poor borrowers, 
organizations must establish a target group of participants and then tailor their financial 
services around its needs. In Bangladesh, the primary target clientele for microcredit are 
rural inhabitants who own less than half an acre of cultivatable land (Grameen Bank and 
BRAC). According to Shahidur Khandker, 79 percent of households in Grameen Bank 
villages, 83 percent in BRAC villages and 85 percent in RD-12 villages met the 
eligibility criterion which suggests that these organizations adhere to their own rules in 
this regard (Khandker 1998, 40). Moreover, 55 percent of Grameen, 65 percent of BRAC 
and 58 percent of RD-12 borrowers came from poorer, landless households which 
suggests that these programs are not only reaching moderately poor borrowers (Khandker 
1998, 40). Despite exponential growth over the past two decades, however, only 45
percent of eligible households in program villages participate in microfinance programs 
for a number of reasons18 (Khandker 1998, 39). 
Microfinance programs in Bangladesh primarily target women because studies 
have demonstrated that women use loans more responsibly and the entire household 
benefits more than when men receive credit (Pitt and Khandker 1998). As critics are 
quick to point out, the ultra poor are not the predominant targets of microfinance, though 
some organizations such as Grameen Bank and BRAC have implemented the Struggling 
Members' Program and the IGVGD Programs respectively. Still, according to Khandker, 
approximately 83 percent of Grameen Bank borrowers were moderately poor and 33 
  
18 Registration fees, group meeting and training session attendance; discrimination against the poorest by 
current borrowers who see them as too risky; and self-exclusion can prevent potential borrowers from 
participating in microfinance programs (Develtere and Huybrechts 2005, 174). 
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percent were extremely poor before participating in its programs; these numbers 
decreased to 62 and 10 percent respectively after five years (Khandker 1998, 56).
The divergent institutional structures and objectives of microfinance providers in 
Bangladesh dictate their target clientele. Some programs, such as BRAC, combine 
microcredit with business training, cooperatives, education and health initiatives while 
minimalist organizations such as the Grameen Bank and ASA emphasize self-reliance 
and individual entrepreneurial capacity and do not buttress their financial services with 
social programs. These different institutional aims can have a large impact on the 
effectiveness of microfinance programs, for the “combined impact of credit and noncredit 
interventions on self-employment profits" is 50 percent higher than that of only noncredit 
interventions (Morduch 1998, 24). One of the most pertinent and effective programs is 
the Non-Formal Primary School (NFPE) program started by BRAC that enables poor 
borrowers (and non-borrowers) children to attend informal school. Clearly when 
microfinance programs provide services tailored to their clients' needs that exceed the 
mere provision of credit, they can have a larger impact on stabilizing household income 
levels and enabling children to receive an education in lieu of working.  
Child Labor Overview
Despite media attention and legislation19 in the United States and around the 
world, millions of children continue to work in Bangladesh whether in tandem with or in 
lieu of attending school. The Bangladesh Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 
conducted by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) and funded by UNICEF 
  
19 U.S. Senator Tom Harkin attempted to pass a bill known as the Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1993 that 
would have banned the importation of any goods that use child labor in any stage of production. 
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estimates that 12.8 percent of children between the ages of 5 and 14 are engaged in child 
labor (MICS 2006, 101). In its 2003 Child Labor Survey, the BBS distinguished between 
two categorizations of working children that garner disparate results. The BBS’ extended 
definition includes children over the age of ten who are engaged in all income-generating 
activities both paid and unpaid, inside and outside of the household while the usual 
definition excludes work inside a child’s household (Salmon 2005, 34). Utilizing the 
extended definition captures the economic contributions of girls which often go 
underestimated because their primary economic activity is domestic housework. The 
BBS estimates that 5.4 million, or 15 percent of children between the ages of 5 and 14, 
were economically active according to the usual definition while about 7.9 million, or 21 
percent, were categorized as such under the extended definition (Salmon 2005, 35). 
Therefore, children comprise anywhere between 9 and 11 percent of the total labor force 
in Bangladesh depending on the definition employed by statisticians (Salmon 2005, 35). 
The BBS survey approximates that, on average, one child works in every Bangladeshi 
household (Tariquzzaman and Kaiser 2008, 2) earning an average income of 43 takas 
($0.62) a day (Salmon 2005, 39). Moreover, 1.3 million children are involved in 
hazardous work (Tariquzzaman and Kaiser 2008, 2) and around 5 million children, or 
around 12 percent of children 5-17, are working and not going to school at all (BBS 
2006).
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Figure 3.7: Child Labor Indicators
SOURCE: World Bank Development Indicators Database from Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics’ National Child Labor Survey 2003
Poverty is one cause of Child Labor 
Though extreme poverty is not the only reason that children work, it is the most 
pervasive trend in the global and domestic statistics of child labor. As elsewhere where 
child labor is endemic, the economic contributions of children in Bangladesh are often 
crucial to the survival of their household. In order to analyze the relationship between 
poverty and child labor, the author will return to the economic model posited by Kaushik 
Basu and Pham Van (1998) in chapter two. The basic premise behind this paradigm is 
that parents send their children to work because they cannot forego the wages lost in the 
short-run by sending their child to school in exchange for the long-run returns to 
education in the form of higher wages. Basu and Van refer to this trade-off as the Luxury 
Axiom in which children work because non-work (i.e. education and leisure) is a luxury 
their parents cannot afford. Empirical data from Bangladesh supports the validity of the 
Luxury Axiom: children from the poorest households in Bangladesh are much more 
Variable 2003
Child employment in agriculture (% of economically active children ages 7-14) 62
Child employment in manufacturing (% of economically active children ages 7-
14) 13
Child employment in services (% of economically active children ages 7-14) 23
Economically active children, female (% of female children ages 7-14) 14
Economically active children, male (% of male children ages 7-14) 21
Economically active children, study and work (% of economically active 
children, ages 7-14) 37
Economically active children, total (% of children ages 7-14) 18
Economically active children, work only (% of economically active children, 
ages 7-14) 63
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likely to work than those from better-off households (Delap 2001; Salmon 2005; Amin, 
Quayes, and Rives 2004; Save the Children, UK; ILO). 
Using data collected by the BBS in the National Labor Force Survey, economist 
Claire Salmon (2005) found that children, especially girls, are much more likely to work 
in households where all of the adults work. Salmon finds that 50 percent of all child 
laborers live in a household where all of the adults work, and in the poorest households, 
children contribute as much as 50 percent of total household income (Salmon 2005, 46). 
Consequently, Salmon concludes that children who work in Bangladesh often do so 
because they are the “last economic resource of the household” (Salmon 2005, 4). The 
fact that household income level and the duration of work are inversely correlated 
demonstrates that parents will only send their children to work when entangled in a 
desperate situation (Salmon 2005, 37). 
Because poverty and child labor are significantly correlated, poverty-reduction 
programs such as microfinance can potentially diminish the likelihood that children will 
work by raising household consumption levels. As leaders of the World Bank team 
responsible for the first and most rigorous evaluation of microfinance in Bangladesh, 
economists Mark Pitt and Shahidur Khandker found that microfinance programs (BRAC, 
Grameen Bank, and the government-funded RD-12 program) increased annual household 
consumption expenditure through self-employment (1998). Khandker and Pitt provide the 
most conclusive evidence that providing women with access to credit has a greater 
impact on a household’s welfare than male borrowers in Bangladesh. In their evaluation 
of BRAC, Grameen, and RD-12, Pitt and Khandker find that for every 100 additional 
77
taka borrowed by women, annual household consumption expenditure increases 18 taka 
compared with 11 taka for men (Pitt and Khandker 1998, 958). 
Scholars provide a number of explanations for this divergence. One observation is 
that males consume more leisure time with increases in household expenditure in a 
patriarchal society where women are solely responsible for household tasks (Pitt and 
Khandker 1998, 984). Moreover, purdah and a labor market divided by gender 
effectively eliminate the ability of women to participate in the wage labor market. 
Therefore women benefit more from capital to start their own business (generally within 
the confines of their home) because men participate in the wage labor market. Because 
women are responsible for domestic tasks and the welfare of their family in Bangladesh, 
one can also assume that they are more likely than their male counterparts to spend their 
earnings on their children and extended family. With the ability to consume beyond their 
immediate means by participating in a microfinance program, sending a child to school is
no longer a luxury that a family cannot afford, and children may be less likely to work. 
Luxury Axiom 
Data from Bangladesh supports the underlying premise of the Luxury Axiom that 
work and non-work, i.e. leisure and education, are substitutes. Theoretically, working and 
attending school are not mutually exclusive for Bangladeshi children. It is entirely 
plausible for children to attend school and work because public primary schools are open 
only 120 days per year and there are only 3-4 hours of class daily (Ravallion and Wodon 
2000, 160). Therefore a child who works 20 hours per week could attend school 
everyday, but unfortunately many do not: only 37 percent of “economically active” 
children aged 7-14 work and attend school while 63 percent of this same group only
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works (World Bank Development Indicators Database 2003). The Luxury Axiom 
provides an economic explanation for the high incidence of child labor, however, it 
cannot be viewed in a vacuum. As previously mentioned in this chapter, limited 
educational opportunities leave many children from poor households with few viable 
alternatives to work. Moreover, children from poor families in Bangladesh often find 
education to be irrelevant because they are more concerned with acquiring practical skills 
necessary to generate more income. Finding little value in school is not a pervasive 
cultural trend, for both children and parents understand the importance of education and 
“failures to send children to school could only be justified in terms of extreme poverty” 
(Tariquzzaman and Kaiser 2008, 2). In fact, school attendance and work seem to be 
substitutes for poor children in Bangladesh. 
According to 1995-1996 Household Expenditure Survey conducted by the BBS, 
15 percent of children enrolled in school gave child labor, defined as “help at work,” 
“farm work,” and “help in the family business”, as the primary reason for their absences 
(Ravallion and Wodon 2000, 160). In an interview with children at an informal school for 
child laborers operated by RDRS in Kurigram, one of the country’s poorest upazilas,20 a 
group of young boys explained that about one a week they were unable to attend school 
because of their heavy workload.21 Save the Children UK and several local advocacy 
organizations persuaded employers to abide by a code of conduct that ensures that 
guarantees working children one and a half hours for school and freedom from hazardous 
working conditions. Though these boys both work and attend school, such a short period 
  
20 Districts are divided into subdistricts known as upazilas which are the lowest administrative level in 
Bangladesh. 
21 Interview with child laborers in Kurigram at RDRS, July 2007. See Appendix 4 for more interviews with 
child laborers. 
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of instruction is insufficient to achieve a minimum level of education, but is more 
beneficial than nothing. This experience highlights the difficulty in analyzing the 
relationship between child labor and education in Bangladesh. One cannot simply 
compare school enrollment rates and data on child labor because it fails to capture the 
variance in standards, attendance and the substitutability of work and school all of which 
have large implications in dictating appropriate policies to attack the problem. 
Economists Martin Ravallion and Quentin Wodon (2000) attempted to determine 
whether or not school and work are substitutes in poor Bangladeshi households by 
analyzing the relationship between school enrollment subsidies and child labor. In 1995-
1996 the government established the Food for Education (FFE) program which provided 
2.2 million children with food rations at school contingent upon achieving an attendance 
rate of at least 85 percent of classes per month (Ravallion and Wodon 2000, 162). In their 
evaluation of the FFE program, Ravallion and Wodon observe that the stipend increased 
school attendance more than it decreased child labor and was divided by gender; for 
boys, “the reduction in the incidence of child labor…represents about one quarter of the 
increase in their school enrollment rate,” while for girls, child labor was reduced by one 
eighth (Ravallion and Wodon 2000, 173). These findings support the hypothesis that 
school attendance and leisure time are luxuries that extremely poor households cannot 
afford in Bangladesh. The authors conclude, “Parents are clearly substituting other uses 
of their children’s time so as to secure the current income gain from access to the 
program with modest impact on earning from their children’s work” (Ravallion and 
Wodon 2000, 173). Therefore, programs that subsidize school attendance in Bangladesh 
may not diminish the likelihood that children from extremely poor households will work 
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either because parents want to maximize the economic benefit of the stipend and continue 
to send their child to work or because of the nature of the relationship between parents 
and children in household labor market decisions.  
Microcredit programs may be more effective than stipends in increasing the 
likelihood that children will go to school, especially those that encourage borrowers to do 
so. Pitt and Khandker find a significant positive correlation between credit and the 
probability that girls will enroll in school for Grameen Bank participants, though not for 
BRAC or the RD-12 program (there is no particular explanation for this divergence as 
Grameen does not provide the children of its borrowers with access to informal 
schooling) (Pitt and Khandker 1998, 986). The authors also find that the sons of female 
participants in both Grameen and RD-12 programs are more likely to attend school than 
those of non-participants (Pitt and Khandker 1998, 986). Morduch also provides evidence 
to support this claim: his data demonstrates that 62 percent of the school-age sons of 
Grameen Bank borrowers are enrolled in school versus 34 percent of the sons of eligible 
households that do not borrow. Providing women with credit significantly increased 
boys’ school enrollment, but had a negligible impact on that of girls according to 
Morduch’s study (Morduch 1998). Girls were no more likely to go to school because 
daughters and mothers are substitutes within the labor supply of a household in 
Bangladesh. The relationship between parents and children in the labor market is 
extremely important in determining the likelihood that children will attend school. 
Substitution Axiom 
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The other tenet of Basu and Van’s econometric model of child labor is the 
Substitution Axiom which assumes that adults and children are substitutes in the labor 
market. Studies conducted in Bangladesh do not support this hypothetical relationship. 
Economists have found that adults and children are not appropriate substitutes in the 
labor market. First, societal perceptions regarding types of work unsuitable for adults 
renders children unlikely substitutes and dictates their income-generating activities 
according to scholar Emily Delap (2001). Low-status jobs considered to be explicitly for 
children include: working as the playmate of a rich employer’s children; cleaning tables, 
lighting stoves, serving water, sweeping and sleeping inside as a protector in small 
restaurants and tea stalls; cleaning equipment, serving tea, snacks and cigarettes, helping 
the mechanic and working in “hard-to-reach” spots in garages; stuffing cotton wool 
inside dolls; washing vegetables in grocery shops; searching through trash; breaking 
bricks for cement, and many other unskilled, “dirty” tasks that adult workers view as 
beneath them (Tariquzzaman and Kaiser 2008, 27).
Second, because the Bangladeshi labor market in heavily divided upon gender 
lines, fathers and sons may be substitutes or complements in household labor decisions 
while mothers and daughters are complements according to economists Shahina Amin, 
Shakil Quayes and Janet M. Rives (Amin, Quayes and Rives 2004, 30). Boys in rural 
areas are substitutes for their father’s labor, though older rural boys are more likely to be 
complements because they work alongside in the field with their father. In the case of 
mothers, even if they contribute enough income to fulfill the needs of their families, one 
reason children may continue to work are concerns about boys’ idleness and girls’ safety 
(Amin, Quayes and Rives 2004, 30). Amin and his colleagues posit that mothers and 
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children are complements in market work outside of the household while mothers and
daughters are substitutes for domestic work (Amin, Quays and Rives 2004). As a result of 
a inadequate child care and the vulnerability of females in a patriarchal society, mothers 
often take their daughters to work with them outside the household or encourage their 
involvement in “market work at home” that may teach them valuable skills, but still 
detracts from their opportunity to attend school (Amin, Quayes and Rives 2004, 30). 
When mothers work, their daughters bear a much heavier burden than their sons because 
they absorb the bulk of domestic responsibilities; consequently, “The relationship 
between mother’s wage and the rate of a girl’s participation in household work could be 
in the form of an inverted U” (Amin, Quayes and Rives 2004, 27). Though the more 
mothers work, the more girls will have to do housework, there is some unknown 
threshold in household income level at which point a mother’s wage eliminates the need 
for daughters to work, presumably because the household can hire someone else to do the 
housework. Regardless of this threshold, girls may be more susceptible to increased 
workloads when their mothers work in either their own business or the wage labor 
market.  
Impact of Gender Inequality on Child Labor
As a result of cultural perceptions of gender and in accordance with global 
patterns in child labor (Fares and Raju 2007), boys in Bangladesh are much more likely 
to be work in the wage labor market than girls: 17.5 percent of boys aged 5 to 14 work 
outside the home while only 8.1 percent of girls within the same age group work (MICS 
2006, 101). Just as in the adult labor market, children’s work is divided along both gender 
and urban-rural lines. For girls, the Muslim practice of purdah, or female seclusion, 
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begins at the onset of puberty, usually around age 12. This cultural more effectively 
eliminates the female wage market for both adult and child labor and causes women and 
girls to work primarily indoors. In urban areas, girls work primarily in factories or as 
domestic servants while in rural areas, girls work primarily as domestic servants or 
rolling bidi, a small cigarette. Consequently, scholars and governments grossly 
underestimate the contribution of female children to household income, for quantitative 
studies on child labor do not capture the myriad unpaid domestic activities conducted by 
girls (Amin, Quays, and Rives 2004, 20). Because Bangladeshi society views housework 
as a task suitable only for women, girls work primarily in the domestic sphere and are 
likely to work longer hours for smaller or no pay. Though they may not threaten their 
safety or well-being like numerous jobs outside of the home, domestic activities detract 
from a girl’s ability to go to school and may be just as detrimental to her development as 
participation in the labor wage market. 
Families often see domestic work as an opportunity for their daughters to acquire 
the skills necessary to serve their husband’s needs. For many Bangladeshi girls, early 
marriage is a fact of life. According to the MICS, 33.1 percent of women between the 
ages of 15 and 49 were married before the age of 15 (MICS 2006, 286). Girls from the 
most destitute households are more likely to be married early because the dowries for 
young brides are much lower than their wealthier counterparts. Furthermore, in this 
patriarchal society, boys bear a more obvious burden to supporting their families and are 
much more likely to work outside of the home and less likely to attend school than their 
female counterparts. In urban areas, boys commonly work as shop assistants, street 
vendors, factory assistants, rickshaw pullers, day laborers, and servants, or engage in 
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tasks such as crushing stones and collecting firewood (Amin, Quayes, and Rives 2004, 
877). Boys are much more likely to work in hazardous or dangerous conditions that 
deprive them of their right to health and livelihood.
Cultural Factors 
Regardless of sex, poor Bangladeshi parents generally view children as dangor, or 
capable of working, from the age of 12 onward and believe that can and should acquire 
valuable skills for better employment in the future (Save the Children UK 2005, 4).
Employers also share the belief that children can benefit from work. In 2007, BRAC and 
Save the Children UK conducted a study evaluating the perceptions of employers who 
utilize child labor. Overall, they found that employers believe that child labor is 
necessary and inevitable. Whether in the informal or formal sector, employers generally 
believe that they are playing a vital and altruistic role in providing poor children with 
income to survive in the short term and training that will enable them to acquire skills for 
future employment. This is especially true in the case of domestic servitude, for wealthy 
households often view employing young girls as servants as a noble and honorable deed. 
In Dhaka, for instance, the most prominent families have three or four young girls 
working as servants who prepare meals, wash their clothes, serve tea, tidy the house, and 
do the majority of household tasks in exchange for food and a place to sleep on the 
kitchen floor. Though some of these young girls are orphans, many come from rural areas 
and send what little, if any, earnings home to their villages. In rare cases, employers may 
pay for their domestic servants to receive an education but generally they do not see a 
need for them to attend school. 
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Though education is a luxury that extremely poor households cannot afford, 
poverty alone insufficiently explains the high prevalence of child labor in Bangladesh. 
Developmental scholar Emily Delap (2001) underscores the fact that child labor is not a 
purely economic phenomenon, for “economic and cultural forces cannot be viewed in 
isolation, as the two often interact” (Delap 2001, 17). In her study of a Dhaka slum, 
Delap found that many children work even if they are not the “last economic resource of 
the household,” (Salmon 2005) as a result of gender norms dictating that boys should 
help financially support their family and girls should be secluded due to purdah (Delap 
2001, 16). Domestic security is another factor in the likelihood that children will work. 
Children may find the workplace to be safer than their homes in households with a single 
parent or guardian and inadequate childcare, where domestic violence occurs or where 
the family moves frequently. Domestic insecurity is more pronounced in urban areas like 
Dhaka where 25 percent of residents live in slums. In these extremely poor and 
dangerous areas, both parents and children are concerned about idleness. Poor children 
often find themselves unoccupied in an environment permeated by violence, drugs and 
other idle children as limited access to schooling leaves them with few, if any, 
alternatives to work.
Unfortunately, many of the jobs exclusively delineated to children endanger or 
harm the health and well-being of participating children. The majority of these jobs occur 
in the informal economy outside of the scope of independent and government monitoring 
agencies and advocacy groups making children more apt to work in hazardous 
conditions. With greater ease of exploitation and fewer legal parameters for employers, 
93.3 percent of child labor in Bangladesh takes place in the informal sector (ILO 2004). 
86
Like many of its low-income counterparts, Bangladesh lacks the financial and legal 
infrastructure requisite of a well-developed and inclusive formal economy which means 
that one finds the majority of economic activity in the informal sector. The existence of 
such a large informal economy provides children with more opportunities for 
employment. 
Impact of Labor Market Composition on Child Labor
The demographic composition of Bangladesh facilitates the participation of 
children in the labor market. First, the extremely high population density (1,109 people 
per square km) (World Bank Development Indicators 2007) renders the demand for labor 
extreme elastic; the large excess supply of labor in the Bangladeshi economy means that 
wages are low for adults, and even lower for children. The absence of a federal minimum 
wage, high demand for unskilled labor and incapacity of the market to absorb adults in 
the formal sector exacerbate household and cultural attributes that drive children to work. 
In rural areas, the population is growing at 4 percent annually exacerbating scarcity in 
extremely poor households and rendering children’s wages a necessity for survival in 
some instances (World Bank Development Indicators 2007). Second, 35 percent of the 
Bangladeshi population is 14 years old or younger making children a vital economic 
resource in a country where roughly half of the population lives below the poverty line 
(World Bank Development Indicators 2007). Scholars estimate that children comprised 9 
to 11 percent of the total labor force in 2000 depending on the definition of child labor 
(Salmon 2005, 33). 
Third, legal barriers to establishing and/or working in a formal business also 
contribute to the dominance of the informal economy. Bangladesh ranks 107 out of 178 
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economies on the Ease of Doing Business scale created by the World Bank and 92nd on 
the Ease of Starting a Business Index (World Bank 2008). As a result of these factors, 
“approximately 80 percent of women and 70 percent of men work in the informal 
economy,” according to estimates put forth by the ILO (USAID 2005, 2). The informal 
economy lacks legal procedures such as paperwork, identification and property rights 
which inhibits the capacity of workers to access financial services that would enable them 
to save, borrow, or invest and leaves its participants extremely vulnerable to fluctuations 
in household income. 
Table 3.8: Population and Labor Force Statistics
Variable 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006
Labor force participation rate, female (% of female 
population ages 15-64) 57 57 55 55 55
Labor force participation rate, male (% of male 
population ages 15-64) 88 88 88 88 88
Labor force participation rate, total (% of total 
population ages 15-64) 73 73 72 72 72
Labor force, female (% of total labor force) 38 38 37 37 37
Population ages 0-14 (% of total) 38 36 36 35 35
Population ages 15-64 (% of total) 59 60 61 61 61
Population ages 65 and above (% of total) 3 4 4 4 4
Population density (people per sq. km) 990 1050 1069 1090 1109
Population growth (annual %) 2 2 2 2 2
Rural population (% of total population) 77 76 75 75 74
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) 3 4
Urban population (% of total) 23 24 25 25 26
SOURCE: World Bank Development Indicators Database 2007
Income Volatility 
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Seasonal fluctuations, natural disasters, and lack of savings cause income levels to 
fluctuate widely in extremely poor households in Bangladesh (Delap 2001; Salmon 2005; 
Save the Children UK 2005). Child labor comes from families that live “hand-to-mouth”, 
households that cannot afford to save even five taka ($0.07) a week. In the rural sector 
where agriculture is the primary economic sector, adverse income shocks such as crop 
failures, floods, river erosion, droughts and lower market prices can unexpectedly and 
drastically diminish the income and consumption levels of poor households. During the 
monsoon season, flooding destroys crops families rely upon for household consumption 
and employment. Because there is no demand for agricultural labor and few job 
alternatives, monsoon season is known as monga, or joblessness in many rural areas. 
Unable to cope with these negative externalities, families will either increase the non-
agricultural income-generating activities of their children or send their children to the city 
to find employment. In such a circumstance, the survival of both the child and his family 
may depend on his economic contribution to household income. One working child aptly 
describes the reality of this desperate time: “Kam nai, khoa nai,” translated as “no work, 
no food.” These observations support the findings of economist Claire Salmon (2005) 
that children who work in Bangladesh do so because they may be the “last economic 
resource of the household” when poor families experience negative, exogenous income 
shocks that stretch their meager resources even further. Consequently, stabilizing 
household income levels may be one of the most effective measures in reducing child 
labor, particularly in rural areas. 
Income volatility arises, in part, from a lack of savings. Hence, access to credit 
may enable poor households to amass savings with which they can better cope with 
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adverse income shocks and eliminate the need for their children to work during these 
times of crisis. Chapter two highlighted econometric analyses conducted outside of 
Bangladesh that support the hypothesis that credit constraints are a major determinant in 
the likelihood of child labor within a household (Jacoby and Skoufias 1997; Ranjan 2001, 
1999; Beegle, Dehejia and Gatti 2004; Guarcello, Mealli and Rosati 2002). If credit 
constraints engender children to work, then microfinance should have a positive impact 
on child labor in Bangladesh.  
In fact, a number of studies show that microfinance stabilizes income in 
Bangladesh and renders households less vulnerable to negative income shocks, thereby 
diminishing child labor (Morduch 1998; Pitt and Khandker 1998; Khandker 1998). 
Although he finds that microcredit has negligible impact on the household income level 
of participants, economist Jonathan Morduch also finds income irregularity to be 47 
percent lower for Grameen Bank members and 54 percent lower households participating 
in BRAC’s microcredit program than those in a control group (Morduch 1998). Morduch 
highlights the fact that microcredit engenders more stable, but not higher, levels of 
consumption by diversifying the household labor supply across seasons (Morduch 1998, 
3). If households that participate in microfinance programs have more resources from 
which to draw in times of crisis such as monga, then their children will either work less 
or not work at all.
Access to Credit may not have a Positive Impact at the Household Level 
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There are also a number of studies that contend that access to credit does not 
necessary increase household consumption or have an overall positive impact on a 
borrower’s family. Though he uses the same data set as Khandker and Pitt collected by 
the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) and the World Bank, Morduch 
finds no evidence that microfinance increase participants’ household consumption or the 
enrollment of their children in school relative to a control group (Morduch 1998, 30). 
Morduch’s primary point of contention is his finding that 30 percent of Grameen Bank 
participants own more than the half-acre cutoff and thus any increase in income or 
consumption level is a function of their greater initial wealth. Though Pitt responds to 
Morduch’s claims and demonstrates the validity of his original findings, this academic 
conflict illustrates that employing different econometric methods can produce 
inconsistent results. 
Still, the work of scholars such as Aminur Rahman (1998) supports the view that 
microcredit may not always have a positive impact at the household level. In his 
anthropological analysis on Grameen Bank, Rahman explains that the push for self-
sustainability within the microfinance industry has incited local bank workers to focus on 
increasing loan disbursement and ensuring timely repayment instead of monitoring and 
responding to the needs of their clients (Aminur Rahman 1998). As a result, borrowers 
are often forced to use what little savings and/or assets they may have in order to meet 
their weekly installments instead of using them for consumption, thereby making them 
worse off, and, in some cases, the pressure to repay loans on time can even incite 
domestic violence (Aminur Rahman 1998). Though microfinance has demonstrably 
improved the lives of millions of participants in Bangladesh, there are instances in which 
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the children of microfinance borrowers may be not better off than those of non-
participants (Morduch 1998; Aminur Rahman 1998; Goetz and Sen Gupta 1996).
No empirical studies have been conducted on the relationship between 
microfinance and child labor in Bangladesh, however, data from other countries, 
economic models and field observations support the hypothesis that microcredit can, but 
does not usually, increase the workload of borrowers’ children. In situations where social 
and institutional pressure for timely loan repayment is really as intense as Aminur 
Rahman posits children may be incited to work or may work more so that their parents 
can repay their loans on time. In an interview with ten boys aged 10-14 conducted at an 
informal school for child laborers operated by RDRS the children said that they 
sometimes have to use their salary for family emergencies or to help repay their parents’ 
loan installments (RDRS 2007). In rural areas parents may not have work for three to 
four months during monga, and in the extremely poor region of Kurigram, children 
provide as much as 13 percent of total household income during this time (Lala 2007).
According to the head of the Children’s Savings Program established by Save the 
Children UK22 in Kurigram, more than 50 percent of participating children use their 
savings to help their parents repay loans (Lala 2007). This small sample may not be 
representative of the entire population, but it does support the hypothesis that 
microfinance can cause children to work as a result of pressure on borrowers to meet 
their weekly loan installments on time.    
Another possible scenario is that as a borrower’s self-employment increases, 
children may work more in the family business or be responsible for a larger share of 
  
22 See conclusion for more information on the Children’s Saving Program. 
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housework. Several studies presented in chapter two support the so-called “Wealth 
Paradox” which is the phenomenon that raising household income may actually increase 
the likelihood that children will work (Bhalotra and Heady 2003; Rogers and Swinnerton 
2003; Edmonds and Turk 2004; Kanbargi and Kulkarni 1991). The intuition behind this 
is as the borrower’s business expands children serve as their most accessible resource for 
labor. Whether or not their parents are microcredit borrowers, 7.5 percent of children who 
work in Bangladesh do so primarily in a family business (MICS 2006, 101). Children 
who work in a family business may be less vulnerable to hazardous work and abuse than 
their counterparts in the wage labor market, but they are still detracted from regularly 
attending school. 
Rural children may be particularly vulnerable to the “Wealth Paradox” where 
agriculture is the primary economic for both adults and children. Amin, Quays and Rives 
explain, “As families become wealthier, they own more land. More land requires more 
labor…and might prefer to have their own children do the work” for the sake of 
convenience (Amin, Quays, and Rives 2004, 22). Boys are more likely to be sent to work 
in the field when the landholdings of their household increase and girls are more likely to 
absorb a greater share of domestic tasks. As previously mentioned, women and girls are 
exclusively responsible for housework in Bangladesh. When parents send their sons to 
work the land, they are limited to working during the day and are not required to 
contribute to household chores. Credit that generates self-employment for female 
borrowers may have a more detrimental impact on girls than boys because women and 
their daughters are substitutes in the domestic labor supply. As a result, in addition to 
working in the fields, girls absorb the majority of household chores (Morduch 1998). 
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Microfinance may not be the Solution for Combating Child Labor in Bangladesh 
Microfinance has the potential to actually increase the likelihood that children 
will work, therefore the provision of credit alone is not an appropriate solution to address 
the high prevalence of child labor in Bangladesh. Save the Children espouses the 
possibility that children do not benefit from microfinance: 
It is clear that where parents participate in credit and savings programs, children’s 
workloads can increase. Children may be asked to help with income-generating 
activities which have been started or intensified with the loan. They may also be 
expected to take on parts of their parents’ or elder siblings duties, such as 
domestic work or childcare, whilst older family members are busy generating 
income. In extreme cases, this can result in children working long hours, doing 
tasks that are too hard for them, endangering their health or dropping out of 
school. It should be stressed, however, that this is uncommon (Marcus, Porter and 
Harper 1999, 31; emphasis added).
In the long run, children are detracted from regular school attendance and denied the 
opportunity to receive an adequate education when they must work more as a result of 
credit provided to their parents. In the short run, however, most children enjoy the 
benefits of higher household consumption levels. According to Save the Children, “In 
most cases, children view the benefits such as eating better, having new clothes or shoes, 
better housing or attending school as outweighing the costs [of participating in credit and 
savings programs]” (Marcus, Porter and Harper 1999, 31). Studies from Bangladesh 
demonstrate that the households of microfinance participants do enjoy higher levels of 
per capita expenditure, net worth and nutritional well-being (Khandker 1998, 50), 
however, the true extent of Bangladeshi children who suffer from their household’s 
participation in microfinance programs is unknown. 
Appendix 4 summarizes field research which illustrates the counterintuitive 
overlap between child labor and microfinance. In an interview with a group of working 
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children participating in the Child Savings Program in Kurigram, 16 out of 17 children 
had parents who participated in a local microfinance program (Child Savers 2007). 
Although there is a possibility of a self-selection bias in this group because a local 
microfinance NGO established the savings program, all of the borrowers were members 
of national MFIs. Overall, out of the 43 working children in this sample, 24 had parents 
who were microfinance clients. This may not constitute a majority, but it represents a 
large enough proportion of the sample to provoke further quantitative research. These 
field observations demonstrate that poor, rural households with extremely volatile 
incomes are more likely to send their children to work and more likely to participate in 
microfinance schemes as both mitigate their economic vulnerability during times of 
crisis. 
Conclusion
Scholars and policymakers highlight the huge impact microfinance has had on 
alleviating poverty in Bangladesh, however, none have made a connection between 
access to credit and child labor. Poverty and child labor are intimately linked, but raising 
household income levels may not diminish child labor either because the increase is not 
sufficient to enable families to withdraw their children from work, or because poverty is 
not the only reason that children work. Moreover, although participation in microfinance 
programs increases the likelihood that children will enroll in school, it does not assure 
that households will withdraw their children from work. In some instances, self-
employment and intense pressure to make timely repayments may actually cause children 
of microcredit borrowers to work more. 
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It is unclear whether microfinance increases school enrollment in Bangladesh 
because of its income-smoothing function, social programs that increase awareness in the 
community about the importance of education or another unknown variable. It is also 
unclear how many working children actually come from households that participate in 
microfinance programs. What is clear is that most children who work do not go to school 
and microfinance could potentially enable them to do so.
Child labor is a complex phenomenon that will only be mitigated through the 
development of political and economic infrastructure (i.e. improving enforcement of 
existing legislation and the education system; augmenting the availability of private 
credit), changing societal perception regarding childhood (i.e. child marriage; viable 
working age, gender inequality, etc.) and augmenting adult wages to such level that 
children have no need to work. The conclusion will provide a number of policy 
recommendations for enhancing the benefits of microfinance to include combating child 
labor.
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Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Bangladesh serves as an archetype for illustrating the challenges that most young, 
low-income countries face in choosing appropriate strategies to alleviate poverty. This 
thesis highlights the possibility that policies aimed at diminishing poverty through credit 
may not be the panacea their supporters uphold them to be. Though it has demonstrated 
great promise as an effective mechanism to increase the income of poor households in 
Bangladesh and around the world, the impact of microfinance cannot be analyzed solely 
in the context of economic data. According to the economic models presented in chapter 
two, access to credit and savings should induce parents to withdraw their children from 
work, however, raising household income levels in Bangladesh may not diminish child 
labor because either the increase is not sufficient to enable families to withdraw their 
children from work, or because poverty is not the only reason that children work. It is 
clear that Bangladeshi children living in households that participate in microfinance 
programs are more likely to go to school, but primary school stipends failed to 
significantly diminish child labor (Ravallion and Wodon 2000) which suggests that 
raising household incomes will not guarantee that children will attend school. In some 
cases, self-employment enabled by microcredit can actually cause the children of 
borrowers to work more which detracts from the possibility that they will attend school. 
Though there have been a number of studies suggesting that there is a positive 
relationship between credit constraints and child labor, no research has been conducted 
analyzing the impact of access to microfinance on child labor. The data and observations
presented in this thesis suggest that working children usually benefit from microfinance, 
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however, there is a certain household income level above which children do not need to 
work, and below which the increases in household income engendered by microfinance 
are not sufficient for parents to withdraw their children from work. 
In order to determine this minimum income threshold and the extent of this 
phenomenon, a research team should conduct a quantitative study that explicitly isolates 
the relationship between child labor and microfinance. The basic premise of this study 
would be a comparison between a control group of households in which children work, 
but their parents do not participate in microfinance programs, and households with 
working children whose parents are microcredit borrowers. After collecting household 
survey data on school attendance, nutritional intake, living standards, and the reasons and 
number of hours that children work, a research team would run regression analyses and 
determine if there is a significant correlation between access to credit and the likelihood 
that children will work. 
Despite the ambiguity of the relationship between access to credit and child labor, 
it is clear that microfinance could be tailored to address the needs of working children 
and their households. In order to enhance the effectiveness of microfinance in 
diminishing child labor, the author recommends that credit providers collaborate with 
child labor advocacy groups to target the parents of working children. Padakhep, for 
example, a national NGO, has drop-in centers that provide education, health, and 
counseling services for street and working children. After a number of years, the parents 
of participants can become eligible to receive microcredit through their children. 
Similarly, MFIs could establish programs that specifically target the parents of working 
children and advocacy groups could facilitate dialogues or educational programs aimed at 
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slowly altering societal perceptions of childhood. Another approach would be to provide 
microcredit to the parents of working children only if they agree to withdraw their 
children from the labor force and limit the number of hours they work in domestic 
activities. The MFI-children’s rights group partnership could then establish formal or 
informal schools and utilize international donors to subsidize expenses such as school 
supplies until parents begin to accrue savings. 
A radical and alternative solution is to provide working children with savings 
accounts, and in some rare cases, small loans to generate income. In 1998, Save the 
Children UK in Bangladesh launched an unprecedented program known as the Children’s 
Saving Program in tandem with local NGOs that provide microfinance to adults. 
Working children generally contribute all of their wages to their parents for immediate 
consumption and lack the opportunity to save any of their earnings to mitigate against 
household crisis or buy things for themselves. In the Children’s Savings Program, field 
workers visit child laborers at their home or workplace and enable them to deposit or 
withdraw money at any time. There are now 800 child savers in the program. In an 
interview with program participants in Kurigram, the majority of children said that they 
used their savings to help their families cope with crises such as illness, crop failure, and 
flooding, pay for their education or that of their siblings and to buy presents for the 
Muslim holiday, Eid (Child Savers 2007). Many of the children have also supplemented 
their meager incomes by purchasing ducks or other small fowl and selling the eggs in the 
local market. Most of these boys work in agriculture tending to cattle belonging to either 
their parents or a neighbor while the majority of girls roll bidi, or thinly-rolled cigarettes, 
which is a common economic activity for female children because it is conducted within 
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the household. Local bidi agents bring rolling papers and materials to girls at home and 
then come by to collect them and sell them to large distributors. The girls explained that 
if they fail to meet their deadline, they get treated badly by their employers. Still, 
participants in the program assert that life has improved since they began saving. Though 
they articulated that they generally liked to work, they recognized the lack of viable 
alternatives: “We have to work to live,” they explained authoritatively, “If we don’t 
work, we don’t have food.” Others asserted, “If I don’t work, I can’t continue my 
education.” These responses illustrate that most working children recognize that child 
labor is not a choice, but a necessity. 
Bangladeshi society is neither archaic nor ignorant, but adult wages in the 
unskilled labor market simply have not increased enough to render children’s economic 
contribution unnecessary at the household level in extremely poor families. If and when 
demand for skilled labor increases and augments average adult wages such as during the 
Industrial Revolution in Britain (Nardinelli 1990) then there will be less demand for 
children in the labor market. Moreover, the current void of a vibrant skilled labor market 
discourages impoverished children and adult workers to value higher education. Though 
the Bangladeshi economy has been diversified over the past two decades, service and 
industry jobs that demand unskilled labor dominate the labor market. In the long run, 
increasing the demand for skilled labor requires private investment, technological 
advancement and economic diversification. A substantive rise in adult wages may 
diminish both the demand for and the supply of children in the labor market as formerly 
destitute households will no longer find it necessary to send their children to work. 
Increasing adult wages would change household labor market decisions such that the 
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Luxury Axiom no longer applies and parents can afford to send their children to school. 
Unfortunately, child labor is not merely a function of wage labor market composition 
therefore such an economic transformation may not yield such results. 
Microfinance and child labor are relatively unimportant issues in light of the fact 
that most of Bangladesh is now in shambles as a result of Cyclone Sidr. In the short term, 
it is vital that the government feed and house its people and rebuild its infrastructure. In 
the long run, however, a reappraisal of the impact between microfinance and child labor 
could maximize its effectiveness and protect the rights of millions of children to 
education and leisure. 
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APPENDIX 1: Primary Microfinance Providers in Bangladesh
PKSF
The Palli-Karma Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) (Rural Employment Support 
Foundation) is an apex institution founded by the government in 1990 that gives financial 
support for the majority of microfinance providers in Bangladesh. In 2003-2004, PKSF 
lent over $58 million US to 206 microfinance organizations throughout the country 
though the primary recipients of these funds were ASA, BRAC, and Proshika (Credit and 
Development Forum 2006, 17). In 2004, PKSF funded 17 percent of the total 
microfinance industry in Bangladesh (CDF 2006, 17). 
ASA
ASA, or “hope” in Bengali, was established in 1978 and began its microcredit and 
savings program in 1991 (CDF 2006, 13). A minimalist MFI, the only services ASA 
offers are small loans targeted to extremely poor women, and small business loans that 
are “usually given to men but given to women subject to demonstrating confidence in 
business” (CDF 2006, 13). ASA has achieved a recovery rate of 99 percent and currently 
has over 3 million members (CDF 2006, 13).
PROSHIKA
PROSHIKA was established in 1976 as an NGO committed to combating poverty 
in a number of ways including practical skill training, savings, and small enterprise 
development programs that provide microloans paired with formal business training, 
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technical and marketing support, etc. Another microfinance program involves educating 
the poor about livestock, fishery, agriculture, organic agriculture, and irrigation in order 
to augment their household income. PROSHIKA works with nearly 2.75 million men and 
women in rural and urban areas throughout Bangladesh (CDF 2006, 12).
103
APPENDIX 2: Child Labor in Bangladesh
Percentage of children aged 5-14 years who are involved in child labor activities, by type 
of work. 
Source: Bangladesh Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey conducted by the BBS 2006 (102). 
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APPENDIX 3: Laborer Students and Student Laborers in Bangladesh
Percentage of children aged 5-14 years who are laborer students and student laborers. 
Source: Bangladesh Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey conducted by the BBS 2006 (103).
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APPENDIX 4: Observations from the Field - Interviews with Working Children 
June-July 2007 (see attached)
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